Peyton Young - Publications


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BOOKS:

Strategic Learning and Its Limits. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Contents and Introduction


Fair Representation, 2nd edition (with M. L. Balinski). Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 2001.
Contents and Introduction


Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998.
Contents and Introduction


Equity In Theory and Practice. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. 
Contents and Introduction  

 

EDITED BOOKS:

Social Dynamics (with Steven N. Durlauf), Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2001.
Contents and Introduction


Negotiation Analysis, Ann Arbor MI: University of Michigan Press, 1991.
Contents and Introduction


Cost Allocation: Methods, Principles, Application, Amsterdam: North-Holland,1985.
Contents and Introduction


Fair Allocation. Proceedings of Symposia in Applied Mathematics, vol. 33, Providence RI: The American Mathematical Society, 1985.
Contents and Introduction


 

SELECTED ARTICLES ARRANGED BY SUBJECT:

Game Theory and Finance

“Systemic Importance Indicators for 33 U.S.Bank Holding Companies: An Overview of Recent Data” (with M. Allahrakha and Paul Glasserman), Office of Financial Research, Brief 15-01, February 2015.

“How Likely Is Contagion in Financial Networks?” (with Paul Glasserman), Journal of Banking and Finance, 50 (2015), 383-399.

“The Limits to Compensation in the Financial Sector” (with Thomas Noe), in Capital Failure: Rebuilding Trust in Financial Services, N. Morris and D. Vines (eds.), Oxford University Press, 2014.

“A Strategy-Proof Test of Portfolio Returns” (with Dean P. Foster), Quantitative Finance, 12 (2012), 671-683.

“Gaming Performance Fees by Portfolio Managers” (with Dean P. Foster), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125 (2010), 1435-1458.

“A Markov Test for Alpha” (with Dean P. Foster and Robert Stine), Wharton Financial Institutions Center Working Paper 11-49, September 2011.

Evolution and Learning

“Stochastic Learning Dynamics and Speed of Convergence in Population Games,” (with Itai Arieli) Econometrica, forthcoming.

The Evolution of Social Norms,Annual Review of Economics, 7 (2015), 359-387.

Achieving Pareto Optimality Through Distributed Learning” (with Jason R. Marden and Lucy Y. Pao), SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 52(2014), 2753-2770.

Rapid Innovation Diffusion in Social Networks” (with Gabriel E. Kreindler), Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111 Suppl 3 (2014), 10881-10888.

Learning in a Black Box” (with H.H. Nax, et al.), Oxford Economics Discussion Paper 653, 2013.

Decentralized Dynamics to Optimal and Stable States in the Assignment Game,” (with H.H. Nax and B.S.R. Pradelski), Proceedings of the 52nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, 2013.

Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics” (with Chris Wallace), In H.P. Young and S. Zamir, eds, The Handbook of Game Theory, vol. IV, Elsevier(2014).

Learning Efficient Nash Equilibria in Distributed Systems” (with Bary S. R. Pradelski), Games and Economic Behavior, 75 (2012), 882-897.

The Dynamics of Social Innovation,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences108, No. 4 (2011), 21285-21291.

Fast Convergence in Evolutionary Equilibrium Selection” (with Gabriel E. Kreindler), Games and Economic Behavior 80 (2013), 39-67.

Social Norms (with Mary A. Burke), in Handbook of Social Economics, volume 1A, edited by Alberto Bisin, Jess Benhabib, and Matthew Jackson. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 2011.

 “Innovation Diffusion in Heterogeneous Populations:Contagion, Social Influence, and Social Learning," American Economic Review, 99 (2009), 1899-1924.

 “Learning by Trial and Error," Games and Economic Behavior, 65 (2009), 626-643.

 “Payoff-Based Dynamics in Multi-Player Weakly Acyclic Games" (with Jason Marden, Gurdal Arslan, and Jeff Shamma). SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 48 (2009), 373-396.

 “Social Norms," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume, eds.  London: Macmillan, 2008.

 “Adaptive Heuristics," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume, eds. London: Macmillan, 2008.

 “Stochastic Adaptive Dynamics," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume, eds. London: Macmillan, 2008.

 “Game Theory: Some Personal Reflections," Game Theory 5 Questions, V. F. Hendricks and P. G. Hansen, eds, Automatic Press, 2007.

 “The Possible and the Impossible in Multi-Agent Learning,”  Artificial Intelligence, 171 (2007), 429-433.

 “Regret Testing: Learning to Play Nash Equilibrium without Knowing You Have an Opponent,” (with Dean P. Foster),  Theoretical Economics, 1 (2006), 341-367.

Social Dynamics: Theory and Applications,” in Handbook of Computational Economics, vol. II. Ken Judd and Leigh Tesfatsion, eds. Amsterdam: North Holland, 2006.            

The Power of Norms,” in Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation, Peter Hammerstein, ed. Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2003. 

 “The Diffusion of Innovations in Social Networks” in  The Economy as a Complex Evolving System, vol. III, Lawrence E. Blume and Steven N. Durlauf, eds. Oxford University Press, 2003.

 “Learning, Hypothesis Testing, and Nash Equilibrium,” (with Dean P. Foster),  Games and Economic Behavior, 45 (2003), 73-96.

Equilibrium Selection in Bargaining Models,” (with K. Binmore and L. Samuelson), Games and Economic Behavior, 45 (2003), 296-328.

 “On the Limits to Rational Learning,” European Economic Review, 46 (2002) 791-99.

 “On the Impossibility of Predicting the Behavior of Rational Agents,” (with Dean P. Foster), Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA,  98, no. 22 (2001), 12848-12853.

 “Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture,” (with Mary A. Burke), American Economic Review, 91 (2001), 559-573.

 “Adaptive Dynamics in Games Played by Heterogeneous Populations,” (with A.  Kryazhimskii and Y. Kaniovski). Games and Economic Behavior, 31 (2000) 50-96.             

Conventional Contracts,” Review of Economic Studies, 65 (1998), 776-792.

On the Nonconvergence of Fictitious Play in Coordination Games,” (with Dean P. Foster), Games and Economic Behavior, 25 (1998), 79-96.

 “Individual Learning and Social Rationality,” European Economic Review, 42 (1998), 651-663.

Social Norms and Economic Welfare,” European Economic Review, 42 (1998), 821-830.

The Economics of Convention,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10 (Spring, 1996), 105-122.

 “Learning Dynamics in Games with Stochastic Perturbations,” (with Yuri Kaniovski),   Games and Economic Behavior, 11 (1995), 330-363.               

The Evolution of Conventions,” Econometrica, 61 (1993), 57-84.   

An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining,” Journal of Economic Theory, 59 (1993), 145-168.

Cooperation in the Short and in the Long Run," (with Dean P. Foster), Games and   Economic Behavior, 3 (1991), 145-156.

Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics," (with Dean P. Foster), Theoretical Population Biology, 38 (1990), 219-232.

 

Distributive Justice

Dividing the Indivisible,” American Behavioral Scientist, 38 (1995), 904-909.

Progressive Taxation and Equal Sacrifice," American Economic Review, 80 (1990),  253-266.”

Distributive Justice in Taxation," Journal of Economic Theory, 44 (1988), 321-335.

Individual Contribution and Just Compensation” in Essays in Honor of Lloyd Shapley, Alvin J. Roth, ed.  New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

On Dividing an Amount According to Individual Claims or Liabilities,” Mathematics of Operations Research, 12 (1987), 398-414.        

Progressive Taxation and the Equal Sacrifice Principle,” Journal of Public Economics 32 (1987), 203-214.

 

Cooperative Game Theory

Cost Allocation, Demand Revelation, and Core Implementation,” Mathematical Social Sciences, 36 (1998), 213-228.

 “Cost Allocation,” in The Handbook of Game Theory, vol. II, Robert J. Aumann and Sergiu Hart, eds. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1994.

Monotonic Solutions of Cooperative Games,” International Journal of Game Theory, 14  (1985), 65-72.

Producer Incentives in Cost Allocation,” Econometrica, 53 (1985), 757-765.

Cost Allocation in Water Resources Development,” (with N. Okada and T. Hashimoto), Water Resources Research, 18 (1982), 361-373.

 

Voting and Representation  

Optimal Voting Rules,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9 (Winter, 1995), 51-64.

Apportionment” (with M. L. Balinski), in Operations Research and the Public Sector.  Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, vol. 6, Steven M. Pollock, Michael H. Rothkopf, and Arnold Barnett, eds. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1994.

Condorcet's Theory of Voting,” American Political Science Review, 82 (1988), 1231-1234.

 “Measuring the Compactness of Legislative Districts,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, 13 (1988), 105-115.

 “Optimal Ranking and Choice from Pairwise Comparisons” in Information Pooling and Group Decision Making, Bernard Grofman and Guillermo Owen, eds. Greenwich CT: JAI Press, 1986.

 “Fair Representation in the European Parliament,”(with M. L. Balinski), Journal of Common Market Studies, 2 (1982), 361-373.

 “Parliamentary Representation and the Amalgam Method,” (with M. L. Balinski), Canadian Journal of Political Science, 14 (1981), 797-812.

 “The Webster Method of Apportionment,” (with M. L. Balinski), Proceedings of the   National Academy of Sciencs of the USA, 77 (1980), 1-4.

Criteria for Proportional Representation," (with M. L. Balinski), Operations Research, 27 (1979), 80-95.    

A Tactical Lobbying Game” in Game Theory and Political Science, Peter C.

 Ordeshook, ed.  New York: New York University Press, 1978.

 “The Jefferson Method of Apportionment,” (with M. L. Balinski), SIAM Review, 20 (1978), 278-284.

 “Stability, Coalitions, and Schisms in Proportional Representation Systems,” (with M. L. Balinski), American Political Science Review, 72 (1978), 848-58.

 “Power, Prices, and Incomes in Voting Systems,” Mathematical Programming, 14 (1978), 129-148.

The Allocation of Funds in Lobbying and Campaigning,” Behavioral Science, 23    (1978), 21-31.

 “A Consistent Extension of Condorcet's Election Principle,” (with Arthur Levenglick), SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics, Part C, 35 (1978), 285-300.

 “Extending Condorcet's Rule,” Journal of Economic Theory, 16 (1977), 335-353.           

The Quota Method of Apportionment,” (with M. L. Balinski), American Mathematical Monthly, 82 (1975), 701-730.

 “Social Choice Scoring Functions,” SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics, 28 (1975), 824-838.

 “A Note on Preference Aggregation,” Econometrica, 42 (1974), 1129-1131.

 “A New Method for Congressional Apportionment,” (with M. L. Balinski), Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA, 71 (1974), 4602-4606.

 “An Axiomatization of Borda's Rule," Journal of Economic Theory, 9 (1974), 43-52.

 

Economic Growth

Interpreting von Neumann Model Prices as Marginal Values,” (with M. L. Balinski), Journal of Economic Theory, 9 (1974), 449-463.           

 

Combinatorial Theory

Matroid Designs of Prime Power Index,” (with Barbu Kestenband),  Journal of Combinatorial Theory, Series A, 24 (1978), 211-234.

On Permutations and Permutation Polytopes, “ Polyhedral Combinatorics: Mathematical Programming Study 8 (1978), 128-140.

Existence Theorems for Matroid Designs,” Transactions of the American Mathematical Society, 183 (1973), 1-35.

Matroid Designs,”(with Jack Edmonds), Journal of Research of the National Bureau of Standards, 77B (1973), 15-44.

 “Affine Triple Systems and Matroid Designs,” Mathematische Zeitschrift, 132 (1973), 343-359.

A Quick Proof of Wagner's Equivalence Theorem,” Journal of the London Mathematical Society," 3 (1971), 661-664.