

Comparative Incompleteness: Measurement, Behavioral Manifestations and Elicitation

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September 13, 2022

Abstract

This paper introduces measures of overall incompleteness of preference relations under risk and uncertainty, as well as measures of incompleteness of beliefs and tastes. These measures are used to define “more incomplete than” relations among different preference relations. We show how greater incompleteness is manifested in the representations of decision makers’ preferences and illustrate its behavioral implications in a simple portfolio choice problem. In addition, the paper introduces incentive compatible schemes of eliciting the degrees of overall incompleteness and those of beliefs and tastes.

Keywords: Incomplete Preferences; Knightian Uncertainty; Comparative Incompleteness; Elicitation Mechanisms.

JEL classification: D81

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“It is conceivable - and may even in a way be more realistic - to allow for cases where the individual is neither able to state which of two alternatives he prefers nor that they are equally desirable.” von Neumann and Morgenstern

1 Introduction

There are situations in which the inability of decision makers to state a clear preference is undeniable. For example, having to decide between two treatments of a disease, one that is expected to expand your life span by 20 years at 70 percent quality of life and another that is expected to expand your life span by 15 years at 90 percent quality of life, a decision maker might have difficulty expressing a clear preference between the two treatments.¹ Incompleteness of preferences is a prevalent feature of actual choice behavior and to assume otherwise does not seem justified on either positive or normative grounds. “Of all the axioms of utility theory, the completeness axiom is perhaps the most questionable. Like others of the axioms, it is inaccurate as a description of real life; but unlike them, we find it hard to accept even from a normative viewpoint.” (Aumann [1962], p. 446).

During the last couple of decades, there has been growing appreciation of the significance of incomplete preferences and recognition of the potential behavioral implications thereof. As a result, there has been an increasing interest in the modeling, analysis and study of economic applications of incomplete preferences.² However, to the best of our knowledge, measures that would allow comparisons of the incompleteness of distinct preference relations have not yet been provided. In view of the role of measurement in scientific inquiry, the lack of measures of incompleteness is a significant lacuna in decision theory.

¹See Attema, Bleichrodt, l’Haridon, and Lipman (2020) for an experimental investigation.

²The study of the representation of incomplete preferences under risk and under uncertainty was pioneered by Aumann (1962) and Bewley (2002). More recently, the issue has been addressed in the works of Dubra, Maccheroni and Ok (2004), Baucells and Shapley (2006), Nau (2006), Seidenfeld, Schervish and Kadane (1995), Galaabaatar and Karni (2013), Ortleva, Ok and Riella (2013), Riella (2015), and Karni (2020a). For an analysis of the implications of incomplete beliefs for equilibrium in financial markets see Rigotti and Shanon (2005).

In this paper, we propose measures of incompleteness of preferences under risk and under uncertainty. These include measures of incompleteness of beliefs, incompleteness of risk attitudes, and overall incompleteness of preference relations under uncertainty. When preferences have multi-prior subjective expected multi-utility representations, we show how these measures of incompleteness capture the sets of subjective probabilities and utilities that constitute the representations of decision makers' preferences. The local properties, or "incompleteness in the small," are investigated as well.

We proceed to introduce measures of comparative incompleteness. We define what it means for one preference relation to be more incomplete than another, both in terms of beliefs, risk attitudes, and overall. We also show how greater incompleteness manifests itself in the representation of preferences.

We illustrate the behavioral implications of greater incompleteness in the context of a simple portfolio choice model. The behavioral manifestations of incompleteness include the range of unpredictability of the decision maker's portfolio position and the level of inertia exhibited in response to changes in security prices. We show that greater incompleteness according to our measures corresponds to both greater inertia and greater unpredictability.

A natural and intuitive idea is to regard one preference relation as displaying greater incompleteness than another if all alternatives that are non-comparable according to the latter are non-comparable according to the former, but not necessarily vice versa. Our definitions of comparative incompleteness are based on this direct ranking of incompleteness. The result is binary relations "more incomplete than" on the set of preference relations that are themselves partial orders.³

We complete the "more incomplete than" relations using our measures by ex-

³The idea of making interpersonal comparisons in this way is not new and has been expressed in the literature in different contexts. Yaari (1969) defines one preference relation as displaying (weakly) greater risk aversion than another if every risk that is acceptable to the former is acceptable to the latter. A similar idea, appears in Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci (2004). They propose interpersonal comparisons of revealed ambiguity, where any element in set of priors characterizing the preference relation of the decision maker who displays smaller revealed ambiguity belongs to the set of priors characterizing the preference relation of the decision maker who displays greater revealed ambiguity.

panding on the following idea. Consider a situation where one preference relation is complete, while another relation is incomplete. Clearly, the complete relation will be able to compare any two alternatives, and we can comfortably state that the complete relation is less incomplete, even when the two decision makers are not necessarily comparing the same alternatives.

Finally, we introduce incentive compatible mechanisms – modified scoring rules – by which the proposed measures of incompleteness may be elicited.

The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces our measures of incompleteness, connects them to properties of multi-prior subjective expected multi-utility representations, and investigates local behavior of the measures. Section 3 defines comparative incompleteness, shows how it manifests itself in the representation of preferences, illustrates its behavioral implications in the context of a simple portfolio choice problem, and completes the comparative incompleteness relations. Section 4 introduces incentive compatible mechanisms by which the measures of incompleteness may be elicited. Concluding remarks appear in Section 5. The proofs are collected in the Appendix.

2 Measuring Incompleteness

2.1 Preliminaries

Let S be a finite set of *states* and denote by $\Delta\mathbb{R}$ the set of simple probability distributions, dubbed *lotteries*, on a set of *real numbers* representing monetary payoffs.⁴ Assume that $\Delta\mathbb{R}$ is endowed by the topology of weak convergence. Subsets of S are *events* and S is the *universal event*. Maps from S to $\Delta\mathbb{R}$ are *acts*. Let the set of acts, $(\Delta\mathbb{R})^S$, be denoted by F and endowed with the product topology. Constant acts are identified with the corresponding elements of $\Delta\mathbb{R}$. Denote by $\delta_x \in \Delta\mathbb{R}$ the constant act whose payoff is the outcome x in every state. Henceforth, we identify $x \in \mathbb{R}$ with the constant act δ_x . Hence, $\mathbb{R} \subset \Delta\mathbb{R}$. A *bet* on an event E is the act $x_E y \in F$ such that $(x_E y)(s) = x$ for all $s \in E$, and $(x_E y)(s) = y$ otherwise, where

⁴A simple probability distribution is a probability distribution with finite support.

$x > y$. A lottery $\ell(r; x, y) \in \Delta\mathbb{R}$, is a constant act that pays x with probability r and y with probability $(1 - r)$.

A *strict preference relation* is an irreflexive and transitive binary relation \succ on F . We assume throughout that the strict preference relation is not empty, and we do not impose that it is negatively transitive. Taking the strict preference relation as primitive we define several induced binary relations on F .⁵ The *indecisive preference relation* \asymp on F is defined as follows: For all $f, g \in F$,

$$f \asymp g \text{ if } \neg(f \succ g) \text{ and } \neg(g \succ f). \quad (1)$$

Then, \asymp is symmetric, reflexive and, in the case of incomplete preferences, intransitive.⁶ Following Galaabaatar and Karni (2013), define the *weak preference relation* \succsim on F as follows: For all $f, g \in F$,

$$f \succsim g \text{ if } h \succ f \text{ implies } h \succ g.$$

Define also the *indifference relation*.⁷ For all $f, g \in F$,

$$f \approx g \text{ if } f \succsim g \text{ and } g \succsim f.$$

Finally, define the *noncomparable relation*: For all $f, g \in F$,

$$f \bowtie g \text{ if } f \asymp g \text{ and } \neg(g \approx f).$$

The strict preference relation is continuous if the upper and lower contour sets, $\{f \in F \mid f \succ g\}$ and $\{f \in F \mid g \succ f\}$, are open for all $g \in F$. Note that if \succ

⁵The advantage of using the strict preference relation is that it has a clear choice meaning while the weak preference relation does not. More importantly, a theorem by Schmeidler (1971) shows that if a weak order on a connected topological space is continuous in the two usual definitions (i.e., closed upper and lower contour sets according to the weak preference and open upper and lower contour sets according to the strict preference relation) then it is complete. Thus, incompleteness requires that one of the continuity conditions must not hold. Karni (2011) showed that this puzzling result is due to the definition of the weak preference relation as the negation of the strict preference relation. Taking the strict preference relation as primitive and invoking the weak preference relation a la Galaabaatar and Karni (2013), the weak order relation may be continuous in both senses and yet incomplete.

⁶The intransitivity of \asymp of F is an implication of \succ not being negatively transitive.

⁷This definition is equivalent to Eliaz and Ok (2006).

is continuous then, for all $g \in F$, the indecisiveness subsets, $\{f \in F \mid f \asymp g\}$ are closed. We assume throughout that the strict preference relation is continuous. We also assume that it is monotonic with respect to first-order stochastic dominance: For all $p, q \in \Delta(\mathbb{R})$, if p first-order stochastically dominates q , then $p \succ q$.⁸

An event E is *null* if $\neg(x_E y \succ y)$, for all $x, y \in \mathbb{R}$ such that $x \succ y$. An event E is *nonnull* if it is not null. Thus, if there are $x, y \in \mathbb{R}$ for which $x_E y \succ y$, then E is nonnull.

Incomplete preferences under uncertainty stem from two sources: incomplete beliefs and incomplete tastes. The former source expresses the decision makers' ambiguous beliefs concerning the likelihoods of events. The latter source expresses the decision makers' indecisiveness regarding the appropriate criterion for the evaluation of risky prospects. When both sources are present, they generally interact. Correspondingly, we develop measures of the incompleteness of beliefs and of tastes as well as measures of the overall degree of incompleteness.

2.2 Measure of belief incompleteness

Borel (1924), Ramsey (1931) and de Finetti (1937) were the first to propose the idea that subjective probabilities may be inferred from the odds a decision maker is just willing to offer when betting on events. To the extent that the subjective probabilities reflect the decision makers' beliefs about the likelihood of the events, the corresponding betting odds measure these beliefs. In the case of incomplete beliefs a decision maker may entertain a set of possible beliefs about the likelihood of an event.

Building on this idea, Smith (1961) explored the representations of beliefs by the betting odds. Allowing for the possibility that a decision maker's betting behavior exhibits distinct acceptable lower and upper odds of betting on an event, Smith proposes that incomplete beliefs are representable by a set of priors, dubbed "medial personal probabilities," derived from the betting odds. The probabilities so derived obey the classical laws of probability and are contained in specified intervals whose

⁸The lottery p first-order stochastically dominates the lottery q if, for all $x \in X$, $\sum_{z \leq x} p(z) \leq \sum_{z \leq x} q(z)$ with strict inequality for some $x \in X$.

endpoints correspond to the upper and lower acceptable odds. The range of the betting odds and the corresponding set of probabilities is a measure of a person's confidence in the correctness of his beliefs about the truth of a proposition or the occurrence of an event.

Walley's (1991) exploration of statistical reasoning with imprecise probabilities introduced the notion of lower prevision (i.e., a real-valued function, defined on a class of gambles whose payoffs are expressed in units of utility, representing the supremum of the buying price, expressed in the same utility units, the decision maker is willing to pay for the gamble). The upper prevision is similarly defined as the infimum selling price of a gamble. Applied to bets on events, (i.e., bets that pay one utility unit on an event and zero utility units on the complementary event), the lower and upper previsions define lower and upper probabilities of the event. The difference between the upper and lower probability of an event is a measure of imprecision of the probability of the event.

Building on the same idea, we define a measure of incompleteness of a decision maker's beliefs about an event by the range of the odds she considers possible when betting on the said event. The novelty of our approach is that we capture the odds by the range of noncomparable bets, with the same payoffs, on events that have objective probabilities (i.e., the set of lotteries, with the same payoffs, that are noncomparable to the bet). Unlike Walley (1991) who defined the payoff of the gambles in units of utility, our approach admits any prizes which, as we shall see, is an advantage when it comes to the elicitation of the measure of belief incompleteness.

Formally, for each $E \in 2^S$ such that neither E nor its complement $E^c = S \setminus E$ are null events, and for any $x, y \in \mathbb{R}$, define

$$R^\succ(x_E y) = \{r \in [0, 1] \mid x_E y \succ \ell(r; x, y)\}. \quad (2)$$

The elements of $R^\succ(x_E y)$ are the winning probabilities of lotteries for which \succ is indecisive between the lottery and a bet on the event E with the same stakes.

Since \succ is monotone with respect to first-order stochastic dominance and continuous,

$$R^\succ(x_E y) = [\underline{r}^\succ(x_E y), \bar{r}^\succ(x_E y)],$$

where $\underline{r}^\succ(x_E y) = \sup\{r \mid x_E y \succ \ell(r; x, y)\}$ and $\bar{r}^\succ(x_E y) = \inf\{r \mid \ell(r; x, y) \succ x_E y\}$.

That $\underline{r}^\succ(x_E y)$ and $\bar{r}^\succ(x_E y)$ exist is an implication of the boundedness (that is, $r \in [0, 1]$) and the fact that the sets are non-empty, (that is, $0 \in \{r \mid x_E y \succ \ell(r; x, y)\}$ and $1 \in \{r \mid \ell(r; x, y) \succ x_E y\}$). Hence, $R^\succ(x_E y)$ is a compact interval.

Since \succ is irreflexive, we have that for every null E , $R^\succ(x_E y) = \{0\}$ and for every E , for which $S \setminus E$ is either null or empty, we have that $R^\succ(x_E y) = \{1\}$, for all $x, y \in \mathbb{R}$. For null events E , we thus define $\underline{r}^\succ(x_E y) = \bar{r}^\succ(x_E y) = 0$, while for events E for which $S \setminus E$ is null or empty, we define $\underline{r}^\succ(x_E y) = \bar{r}^\succ(x_E y) = 1$, for all $x, y \in \mathbb{R}$. With this in mind we make the following definition.

Definition 1 For every $E \in 2^S$, and $x, y \in \mathbb{R}$, the measure of **belief incompleteness** of \succ at \mathbf{x}_{EY} is $m_b(x_E y; \succ) = \bar{r}^\succ(x_E y) - \underline{r}^\succ(x_E y)$.

Definition 1 captures the preference relation's incompleteness that arises from the decision maker being unsure of how a subjective bet on event E compares to objective lotteries.⁹ Hence the name “belief incompleteness” is natural. The payoffs of the bet, x and y , constitute a “measuring rod” of the incompleteness of beliefs.¹⁰ If E is null or the empty set then $m_b(x_E y; \succ) = 0$. If \succ is negatively transitive then $m_b(x_E y; \succ) = 0$ for all E . Clearly, $m_b(x_E y; \succ) = m_b(x_{E^c} y; \succ)$, for all $E \in 2^S$ and $x, y \in \mathbb{R}$.

⁹In an experimental setting, Cettolin and Riedl (2019) asked subjects to choose between a bet and lotteries with the same payoffs and varying probabilities of winning. For each lottery, the subject could also choose “option mix”, which is a 50-50 probability mixture of the bet and the lottery. Subjects that chose the mix option multiple times but refused, in some instances, to pay for the option to keep the mixture are said to exhibit choice behavior consistent with preference incompleteness. About half of the subjects in the experiment displayed this behavior.

¹⁰Having \mathbb{R} being the domain of the payoffs x and y is not necessary for measuring incomplete beliefs. Any payoffs x, y that are ranked $x \succ y$ will constitute a measuring rod. This is not the case for the measure of taste incompleteness that will be defined below. For that measure, we are using certainty equivalents as a measuring rod. In order for certainty equivalents to be well-defined, we need to have a *continuum* of outcomes. Furthermore, the outcomes need to be ranked the same way by all decision makers that are to be compared.

2.3 Measure of taste incompleteness

Consider next the measurement of incompleteness of preference relations under risk,¹¹ by restricting \succ to $\Delta\mathbb{R}$. For every $p \in \Delta\mathbb{R}$, define

$$C^\succ(p) = \{c \in \mathbb{R} \mid p \succ \delta_c\}. \quad (3)$$

The elements of $C^\succ(p)$ are certain amounts for which \succ is indecisive between the amount and the lottery p . Then

$$C^\succ(p) = [\underline{c}^\succ(p), \bar{c}^\succ(p)], \quad (4)$$

where $\bar{c}^\succ(p) = \inf\{c \in \mathbb{R} \mid \delta_c \succ p\}$ and $\underline{c}^\succ(p) = \sup\{c \in \mathbb{R} \mid p \succ \delta_c\}$. That $\bar{c}^\succ(p)$ and $\underline{c}^\succ(p)$ exist is an implication of $C^\succ(p)$ being closed (it is the complement of an open set), the support of p being finite and, hence, bounded, and the fact that \succ satisfies first-order stochastic dominance. We use these notations to define a measure of taste incompleteness (i.e. of the incompleteness of the decision maker's risk attitudes).

Definition 2 For every lottery $p \in \Delta\mathbb{R}$, the measure of **taste incompleteness** of \succ at \mathbf{p} is $m_t(p; \succ) = \bar{c}^\succ(p) - \underline{c}^\succ(p)$.

The measure in Definition 2 captures the degree to which a decision maker is unsure of how a lottery compares to certain amounts.¹² In other words, it captures the degree to which a decision maker is unable to evaluate the riskiness of p . Since no subjective uncertainty is involved for the objects under comparison, we view it as a measure of taste incompleteness.

Let $\mu(p)$ denote the expected value, or mean, of p . Define

$$\bar{\xi}^\succ(p) := \mu(p) - \underline{c}^\succ(p) \quad (5)$$

and

$$\underline{\xi}^\succ(p) := \mu(p) - \bar{c}^\succ(p), \quad (6)$$

¹¹See Dubra, Maccheroni and Ok (2004) and Baucells and Shapley (2008) for axiomatic characterizations of expected utility representations with incomplete preferences under risk.

¹²Danan and Ziegelmeyer (2006) use binary lotteries, $l(\bar{z}, \underline{z})$ with two prizes, $\bar{z} > \underline{z}$ to define the measure of incompleteness under risk as follows: $v = (\bar{c}^\succ(l) - \underline{c}^\succ(l)) / (\bar{z} - \underline{z})$.

which are, respectively, the highest and lowest risk premiums of the lottery p according to \succ . Then,

$$m_t(p; \succ) = \bar{\xi}^\succ(p) - \underline{\xi}^\succ(p). \quad (7)$$

2.4 Measure of overall incompleteness

The overall degree of incompleteness of a preference relation at E amalgamates the incompleteness of beliefs and of tastes. A decision maker may be unsure of how a subjective bet on E compares to objective lotteries, and also of how to assess the risk represented by these lotteries. That is, for a subjective bet on E , there is a set of non-comparable lotteries, and for each of these non-comparable lotteries, there is a range of sure payoffs that are non-comparable to the lottery. Because a bet on E corresponds to a set of non-comparable lotteries, the question arises how to incorporate the values of the certain payoffs into the measure of the overall incompleteness of the preference relation at E .

For each event, $E \in 2^S$ and $x, y \in \mathbb{R}$, define

$$O^\succ(x_E y) = \{c \in \mathbb{R} \mid x_E y \succ \delta_c\}. \quad (8)$$


The elements of $O^\succ(x_E y)$ are certain payoffs for which \succ is indecisive between the payoff and the bet $x_E y$. Then,

$$O^\succ(x_E y) = [\underline{c}(x_E y; \succ), \bar{c}(x_E y; \succ)],$$

where $\bar{c}(x_E y; \succ) = \inf\{c \in \mathbb{R} \mid \delta_c \succ x_E y\}$ and $\underline{c}^\succ(x_E y; \succ) = \sup\{c \in \mathbb{R} \mid x_E y \succ \delta_c\}$. That $\bar{c}(x_E y; \succ)$ and $\underline{c}(x_E y; \succ)$ exist when neither E nor its complement is null follows from the fact that, by first-order stochastic dominance $\{c \in \mathbb{R} \mid \delta_c \succ x_E y\}$ is non-empty and bounded below by y and, similarly, $\{c \in \mathbb{R} \mid x_E y \succ \delta_c\}$ is non-empty and bounded above by x . If E is the universal event, define $\bar{c}(x_E y; \succ) = \underline{c}(x_E y; \succ) = x$, and if E is null, define $\bar{c}(x_E y; \succ) = \underline{c}(x_E y; \succ) = y$. Using these notations we make the following definition:

Definition 3 For every $E \in 2^S$, the measure of **overall incompleteness** of \succ at $\mathbf{x}_{E\mathbf{Y}}$ is $M(x_E y; \succ) = \bar{c}(x_E y; \succ) - \underline{c}(x_E y; \succ)$.

Figure 1: Illustration of the Measure of Overall Incompleteness at $x_E y$



The measure of overall incompleteness at $x_E y$ is illustrated in Figure 1. The point (x, y) is the particular bet on E under consideration. The two curves through the point are the boundaries of the set of bets on or against E that are non-comparable to $(x_E y)$. In other words, every bet on and between the curves is non-comparable to $(x_E y)$. Points on the 45-degree line are certain payoffs, since they pay the same in E and $\neg E$.

If E is either a null event or the universal event then $M(x_E y; \succ) = 0$ for all x, y . If \succ is negatively transitive then, $M(x_E y; \succ) = 0$ for all E and for all x, y .

2.5 Manifestations in the representation of preferences

If preferences have a multi-prior expected multi-utility (MPEMU) representation, axiomatized in Galaabaatar and Karni (2013), our measures of incompleteness have specific manifestations in the representation. The incomplete preference relation \succ on F has a MPEMU product representation if the following holds: For all $f, g \in F$,

$$f \succ g \Leftrightarrow \sum_{s \in S} U(f(s))\pi(s) > \sum_{s \in S} U(g(s))\pi(s), \forall (\pi, U) \in \Pi \times \mathcal{U}, \quad (9)$$

where Π a unique closed convex set of subjective probability measures on S and \mathcal{U} is a set of real-valued, affine, functions on $\Delta\mathbb{R}$. Without loss of generality, we assume henceforth that the set \mathcal{U} is convex.¹³ The representation in (9) includes two special cases: (a) Bewley’s (2020) *Knightian uncertainty* in which \succ on the subset of constant acts (that is, on $\Delta\mathbb{R}$) is negatively transitive and, consequently, \mathcal{U} is a singleton set, and (b) the case of complete beliefs in which Π is a singleton set.

Definition 1 does not rule out that the measure $m_b(x_Ey; \succ)$ depends on the “measuring rod” being used, that is, on the payoffs x and y . However, as we show in Theorem 1 below, if the decision maker’s preferences admit MPEMU representation then $m_b(x_Ey; \succ)$ is independent of the choice of x and y , and of the decision maker’s risk attitudes.

For each $E \in 2^S$, let $\bar{\pi}(E) := \max_{\pi \in \Pi} \pi(E)$ and $\underline{\pi}(E) := \min_{\pi \in \Pi} \pi(E)$. Then $\bar{\pi}(E) - \underline{\pi}(E)$ represents the range of beliefs that, according to \succ , the true state is in E .¹⁴ We show next that, for MPEMU preferences, the probability measure of belief-incompleteness in Definition 1 is equal to the length of the interval of subjective probabilities of E .

Theorem 1 *If an incomplete preference relation \succ on F has MPEMU representation, then the measure of belief incompleteness at E , $m_b(x_Ey; \succ)$, is independent of the outcomes x and y and of the set of utility functions \mathcal{U} in the representation. Furthermore, $m_b(x_Ey; \succ) := m_b(E; \succ) = \bar{\pi}(E) - \underline{\pi}(E)$.*

The proof is in the Appendix. It is worth underscoring that this result also holds if instead of MPEMU preferences the decision maker’s preference relation displays probabilistic sophistication a la Machina and Schmeidler (1995).¹⁵

¹³To see that this is without loss of generality, note that for any $U, \hat{U} \in \mathcal{U}$, $\sum_{s \in S} U(f(s))\pi(s) > \sum_{s \in S} U(g(s))$ and $\sum_{s \in S} \hat{U}(f(s))\pi(s) > \sum_{s \in S} \hat{U}(g(s))$ if and only if $\sum_{s \in S} \alpha U(f(s)) + (1 - \alpha)\hat{U}(f(s))\pi(s) > \sum_{s \in S} \alpha U(g(s)) + (1 - \alpha)\hat{U}(g(s))\pi(s)$ for all $\alpha \in [0, 1]$. Thus, a set of utility functions represents the same preferences as the convex hull of the set of utility functions represents.

¹⁴That $\bar{\pi}(E)$ and $\underline{\pi}(E)$ exist is an implication of the compactness of $\Pi(E)$ and the linearity of the preference functional.

¹⁵In other words, if the preference relation satisfies the axioms of Machina and Schmeidler (1995), except the completeness axiom, then the probabilistic sophisticated representation involves a set of

Unlike the measure of incomplete beliefs, the measure of the overall incompleteness of a preference relation at $x_E y$ depends on the “measuring rod”, that is, the payoffs x and y that are used to construct it. This dependence is a consequence of the fact that the magnitudes of the payoffs determine the riskiness of the bet. Because the measure of overall incompleteness incorporates the decision maker’s risk attitudes, it must be sensitive to the risk of the bet.

2.6 Measures of incompleteness in the small

Consider next the local version of our measures of incompleteness. This analysis allows us to express the measures of incompleteness in terms of the properties of the subjective probabilities and the utility functions that figure in the MPEMU representation. Fix a probability r and consider a lottery $\ell(r; x, y)$. Denote its mean by $\mu_r(x, y)$ and its variance by $\sigma_r^2(x, y)$. Let u denote the Bernoulli utility function corresponding to U , so that $U(p) = \sum_{x \in \text{supp}(p)} p(x)u(x)$, for all $p \in \Delta(\mathbb{R})$. We assume that the functions u are twice differentiable.

We first consider our measure of taste incompleteness as $\sigma_r^2(x, y) \rightarrow 0$ while keeping the mean of the lottery constant. We show that, locally around $\mu_r(x, y)$, the measure of taste incompleteness is proportional to the largest difference in the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk-aversion, evaluated at $\mu_r(x, y)$, displayed by the utility functions that figure in the representation. Formally,

Proposition 1 *The measure of taste incompleteness of \succ at $\ell(r; x, y)$ satisfies*

$$m_t(\ell(r; x, y); \succ) = \left[\max_{U \in \mathcal{U}} \left(-\frac{u''(\mu_r(x, y))}{u'(\mu_r(x, y))} \right) - \min_{U \in \mathcal{U}} \left(-\frac{u''(\mu_r(x, y))}{u'(\mu_r(x, y))} \right) \right] \frac{\sigma_r^2(x, y)}{2} + o(\sigma_r^2(x, y)).$$

Note that $\sigma_r^2(x, y) = r(1-r)(x-y)^2$. Hence, $o(\sigma_r^2(x, y)) = o((x-y)^2)$. Therefore, the difference in the Arrow-Pratt measure between the utility functions in the representation is a good approximation of taste incompleteness for low-variance lotteries.

priors Π and a set, \mathcal{V} , of utility functions (see Karni [2020a]). The corresponding measure of belief incompleteness, $m_b(E; \succ)$, is independent of the outcomes used for the elicitation and the utility functions in \mathcal{V} .

Recall that the measure of taste incompleteness captures the degree to which a decision maker is unable to evaluate the riskiness of lotteries. Proposition 1 shows that this inability is reflected in the range of risk attitudes the decision maker may have at the mean of the lottery.

When preferences exhibit both taste and belief incompleteness, the mean of a bet $x_E y$ is not uniquely defined, nor is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of risk aversion. Proposition 2 below shows that the measure of overall incompleteness can still be approximated by well-known measures for small stake bets on E .

Proposition 2 *The measure of overall incompleteness of \succ at $x_E y$ satisfies*

$$\begin{aligned} M(x_E y; \succ) &= (\bar{\pi}(E) - \underline{\pi}(E))(x - y) \\ &+ \frac{1}{2} \left[\max_{U \in \mathcal{U}} \left(-\frac{u''(\mu_{\underline{\pi}(E)}(x, y))}{u'(\mu_{\underline{\pi}(E)}(x, y))} \right) \sigma_{\underline{\pi}(E)}^2(x, y) - \min_{U \in \mathcal{U}} \left(-\frac{u''(\mu_{\bar{\pi}(E)}(x, y))}{u'(\mu_{\bar{\pi}(E)}(x, y))} \right) \sigma_{\bar{\pi}(E)}^2(x, y) \right] \\ &+ o((x - y)^2). \end{aligned}$$

The first term in the square brackets is the variance of the bet according to the DM's belief assigning lowest probability to E times the largest Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion at the mean of the bet according to that belief. The second term in the square brackets is the variance of the bet according to the belief assigning highest probability to E times the smallest Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion at the mean of the bet according to that belief. Proposition 2 states that, locally the measure of overall incompleteness can be decomposed into the difference between these terms and the measure of belief incompleteness weighted by the stakes of the bet. Formally, by Theorem 1,¹⁶ $\bar{\pi}(E) - \underline{\pi}(E) = \bar{r}^\succ(E) - \underline{r}^\succ(E)$ and, by Pratt (1964),

$$\begin{aligned} &\bar{\xi}^\succ(\ell(\underline{r}^\succ(E); x, y)) - \underline{\xi}^\succ(\ell(\bar{r}^\succ(E); x, y)) \\ &= \max_{U \in \mathcal{U}} \left(-\frac{u''(\mu_{\underline{\pi}(E)}(x, y))}{u'(\mu_{\underline{\pi}(E)}(x, y))} \right) \frac{\sigma_{\underline{\pi}(E)}^2(x, y)}{2} - \min_{U \in \mathcal{U}} \left(-\frac{u''(\mu_{\bar{\pi}(E)}(x, y))}{u'(\mu_{\bar{\pi}(E)}(x, y))} \right) \frac{\sigma_{\bar{\pi}(E)}^2(x, y)}{2}. \end{aligned}$$

Hence, we have that

$$M(x_E y; \succ) = (\bar{r}^\succ(E) - \underline{r}^\succ(E))(x - y) + (\bar{\xi}^\succ(\ell(\underline{r}^\succ(E); x, y)) - \underline{\xi}^\succ(\ell(\bar{r}^\succ(E); x, y))).$$

¹⁶We have shown that when preferences have MPEMU representation, $m_b(x_E y, \succ)$ is independent of x, y , therefore we can write $\bar{r}^\succ(x_E y) = \bar{r}^\succ(E)$ and $\underline{r}^\succ(x_E y) = \underline{r}^\succ(E)$.

That is, the measure of overall incompleteness at a bet is given by the dispersion of the beliefs weighted by the stakes of the bet and the difference between the highest risk-premium of the lottery corresponding to the lowest beliefs and the smallest risk-premium of the lottery corresponding to the highest beliefs.

In the case of complete beliefs, $\underline{\pi}(E) = \bar{\pi}(E)$ and $\sigma_{\underline{\pi}(E)}^2(x, y) = \sigma_{\bar{\pi}(E)}^2(x, y)$. Hence, the term in the square brackets in Proposition 2 equals the local measure of taste incompleteness in Proposition 1. When beliefs are incomplete and $\underline{\pi}^\succ(E) \neq \bar{\pi}^\succ(E)$, the term in the square brackets can be positive or negative depending on the local curvature of the utility functions at the highest and lowest mean of the bet. Thus, while $M(x_E y; \succ)$ measures the combined effect of incomplete beliefs and tastes, even locally and with the measure of belief incompleteness weighted by the stakes of the bet, it is not additive in the measures of belief and taste incompleteness. This is because the belief and taste incompleteness interact. Taste incompleteness is defined at a particular lottery, and belief incompleteness means that two different lotteries are evaluated. The exact nature of the interaction is described in Proposition 2.

We have the following corollary of Proposition 2:

Corollary 1 *The derivative of the measure of overall incompleteness of \succ at $x_E y$, evaluated at $y = x$, equals the measure of belief incompleteness of \succ at E . That is,*

$$\lim_{y \rightarrow x} \frac{M(x_E y; \succ)}{x - y} = \bar{r}^\succ(E) - \underline{r}^\succ(E) = m_b(E; \succ).$$

The result in Corollary 1 is intuitive, since when the stakes of the bet are zero, the preference relation displays risk neutrality and, consequently, the decision maker's risk attitudes are unambiguous. Consequently, in the limit the tastes are complete, and the only source of incompleteness is the belief. Thus, in the limit the model reduces to Knightian uncertainty.¹⁷

¹⁷This result is obtained by dividing by $(x - y)$ on both sides of the equation in Proposition 2 and taking the limit as $y \rightarrow x$.

3 Comparative Incompleteness: Measurement and Behavioral Manifestations

We now return to general (model free) incomplete preference relations and define binary relations “more incomplete than” on the set of preference relations. There is a similarity between measuring risk aversion and measuring incompleteness. The Arrow-Pratt measures of absolute and relative risk aversion are local (at every level of wealth). Consequently, interpersonal comparisons of risk attitudes are defined locally and if the local relationship “more risk averse” holds at every level of wealth, then the comparison is global. Our measures of incompleteness are also defined locally. In the case of incomplete beliefs the measure is defined locally at events and in the case of incomplete tastes it is defined locally at lotteries. Interpersonal comparisons of the degree of incompleteness are defined locally and if the local relationship “more incomplete” holds at each event (for beliefs) or lottery (for tastes) then the comparison is global.

3.1 Definitions of Comparative Incompleteness

The comparative measures that we introduce here are set-inclusion concepts of “more incomplete than.” They are partial binary relations on the set of preference relations on F , and consequently do not rank all preference relations, even locally. However, if two relations are comparable according to these measures, it has clear behavioral implications, which we illustrate in subsection 3.2.

Definition 4 below states that one preference relation is “more belief incomplete” than another at E if for every lottery for which the latter is indecisive between the lottery and a bet on E , the former is also indecisive between the lottery and the same bet on E . We later relate comparative incompleteness to our measures of incompleteness.

Definition 4 *A preference relation \succ_1 displays **greater belief incompleteness** at E than preference relation \succ_2 if $x_{Ey} \asymp_2 \ell(r; x, y)$ implies $x_{Ey} \asymp_1 \ell(r; x, y)$, for all bets on E . It displays **strictly greater belief-incompleteness** at E if it displays greater belief-incompleteness and, in addition, for some $\ell(r; x, y)$, $x_{Ey} \asymp_1 \ell(r; x, y)$*

and $\neg(x_{Ey} \succ_2 \ell(r; x, y))$. It displays greater (strictly greater) belief incompleteness on F if it displays greater (strictly greater) belief incompleteness at E for all nonnull $E \in 2^S \setminus S$.

Applying the same idea to the preference relations on $\Delta(\mathbb{R})$, Definition 5 states that one preference relation is “more taste incomplete” than another at p if every certain amount for which the latter is indecisive between the amount and p , the former is also indecisive between the amount and p .

Definition 5 On $\Delta\mathbb{R}$, a preference relation \succ_1 displays **greater taste incompleteness** at p than preference relation \succ_2 if $p \succ_2 \delta_c$ implies $p \succ_1 \delta_c$. It displays strictly greater taste incompleteness at p if it displays greater taste incompleteness and, in addition, for some δ_c , $p \succ_1 \delta_c$ and $\neg(p \succ_2 \delta_c)$. It displays greater (strictly greater) taste incompleteness on $\Delta\mathbb{R}$ if it displays greater (strictly greater) taste incompleteness at all nondegenerate $p \in \Delta\mathbb{R}$.

Similarly, one preference relation is “more incomplete overall” than another at E if every certain amount for which the latter is indecisive between the amount and a bet on E , the former is also indecisive between the amount and the same bet on E .

Definition 6 A preference relation \succ_1 displays **greater overall incompleteness** at E than preference relation \succ_2 if $x_{Ey} \succ_2 \delta_c$ implies $x_{Ey} \succ_1 \delta_c$ for all x, y , such that $x > y$. It displays strictly greater overall incompleteness at E if it displays greater overall incompleteness at E and, in addition, for some δ_c, x, y such that $x > y$, $x_{Ey} \succ_1 \delta_c$ and $\neg(x_{Ey} \succ_2 \delta_c)$. It displays greater (strictly greater) overall incompleteness on F if it displays greater (strictly greater) incompleteness at E for all nonnull $E \in 2^S \setminus S$.

The following are immediate implications of Definitions 4, 5, and 6, respectively:

1. The preference relation \succ_1 on F displays greater belief-incompleteness at E than \succ_2 if and only if $R^{\succ_2}(E) \subseteq R^{\succ_1}(E)$.
2. The preference relation \succ_1 displays greater taste incompleteness at p than \succ_2 if and only if $C^{\succ_2}(p) \subseteq C^{\succ_1}(p)$.

3. The preference relation \succ_1 displays greater overall incompleteness than \succ_2 at E if and only if $O^{\succ_2}(x_E y) \subseteq O^{\succ_1}(x_E y)$ for all x, y , such that $x > y$.

The notions of comparative incompleteness defined above therefore translate to our measures of incompleteness as described in Corollary 2.

Corollary 2 *The following relations hold:*

1. *If the preference relation \succ_1 on F displays greater belief-incompleteness at E than \succ_2 , then $m_b(x_E y; \succ_1) \geq m_b(x_E y; \succ_2)$ for all x, y such that $x > y$.*
2. *If the preference relation \succ_1 displays greater taste incompleteness at p than \succ_2 , then $m_t(p; \succ_1) \geq m_t(p; \succ_2)$.*
3. *If the preference relation \succ_1 displays greater overall incompleteness than \succ_2 at E , then $M(x_E y; \succ_1) \geq M(x_E y; \succ_2)$ for all x, y such that $x > y$.*

As Corollary 2 shows, the implications go in one direction. This is because the comparative incompleteness relations as defined above are themselves incomplete relations.

In general, one decision maker may display greater belief incompleteness but smaller taste incompleteness than another or vice versa. This makes the comparison of the overall incompleteness depend on the relative magnitudes of the incompleteness of beliefs and tastes (or risk attitudes) of the decision makers being compared. If one decision maker displays greater incompleteness of both beliefs and tastes then, not surprisingly, she displays greater overall incompleteness. Formally, we have the following result:

Proposition 3 *If a preference relation \succ_1 displays greater belief and taste incompleteness than preference relation \succ_2 then it displays greater overall incompleteness.*

The following result links the measure of greater belief incompleteness and the beliefs in the MPEMU representations:

Corollary 3 *Suppose preference relations \succ_1 and \succ_2 on F both admit MPEMU representations. The preference relation \succ_1 on F displays greater (strictly greater) belief incompleteness at E than \succ_2 if and only if $[\underline{\pi}_2(E), \bar{\pi}_2(E)] \subseteq [\underline{\pi}_1(E), \bar{\pi}_1(E)]$.*

According to Corollary 3, \succ_1 displays greater belief incompleteness than \succ_2 if and only if the set of prior beliefs for \succ_2 is a subset of the set of prior beliefs for \succ_1 .

Incomplete beliefs and tastes have distinct effects on the overall measure of incompleteness. This can be easily grasped by considering two decision makers with MPEMU preferences and complete tastes. Even if the beliefs of the two decision makers are incomplete to the same degree, unless their Bernoulli utility functions belong to the same equivalence class (i.e., display the same risk attitudes), the overall measure of incompleteness may be different due to possible distinct risk attitudes. For example, fix a bet $x_E y$ on E , and consider preference relations \succ_i , $i = 1, 2$ exhibiting Knightian uncertainty. Assume that $\Pi_1 = \Pi_2$ and suppose that \succ_1 displays greater absolute risk aversion at $\mu(\underline{\pi}; x, y)$ and smaller absolute risk aversion at $\mu(\bar{\pi}; x, y)$ than \succ_2 . Then, $\xi(\ell(\bar{\pi}; x, y); \succ_1) < \xi(\ell(\bar{\pi}; x, y); \succ_2)$ and $\xi(\ell(\underline{\pi}; x, y); \succ_1) > \xi(\ell(\underline{\pi}; x, y); \succ_2)$.

3.2 Portfolio choice

The behavioral manifestations of incomplete preferences are inertia and unpredictability. Loosely speaking, inertia means that to take an action, a decision maker must be persuaded that the action dominates not taking it (i.e. sticking to the status quo) according to all the possible values he may attribute to the outcomes of the action and the beliefs he entertains about the likelihoods of these outcomes. Unpredictability means that when a decision maker decides that a change is called for, it is impossible to predict which of a set of feasible actions he will take.

Invoking the definitions of comparative incompleteness in subsection 3.1, we study the levels of inertia and unpredictability in the context of a simple portfolio selection model. More specifically, we show how comparative incompleteness translates to the level of unpredictability of a decision maker's portfolio choice behavior (that is, the size of the set of portfolio positions she may choose) and the level of inertia she displays.

Let $S = \{1, 2\}$, then an act is depicted by the point in \mathbb{R}_+^2 whose coordinates are the payoffs in the two states. Consider a decision maker whose preference relation \succ on \mathbb{R}_+^2 is incomplete and has a multi-prior expected multi-utility representation. With slight abuse of notation, let the decision maker's set of priors be $\Pi = \{(\pi, 1-\pi) \mid \pi \in [\underline{\pi}, \bar{\pi}]\}$, where $[\underline{\pi}, \bar{\pi}]$ denotes the range of subjective probabilities of state 1, and denote by \mathcal{U} the set of Bernoulli utility functions corresponding to \succ . We assume that the decision maker displays risk aversion. Formally, assume that the elements of \mathcal{U} are monotonic increasing, concave, real-valued functions on \mathbb{R}_+ .

Let there be two Arrow securities, a_1 and a_2 , with a_s paying one dollar contingent on the realization of state $s \in \{1, 2\}$. Denote by q the relative price of a_1 in terms of a_2 , (i.e., a_2 is the numeraire Arrow security). Suppose that the decision maker's initial endowment consists of an equal number, w_0 , of the two Arrow securities and denote the corresponding budget set $\{(w_1, w_2) \in \mathbb{R}_2 \mid qw_1 + w_2 \leq qw_0 + w_0\}$ by $B(w_0, q)$.

The decision maker's problem is to choose a portfolio $(w_1^*, w_2^*) \in B(w_0, q)$ of Arrow securities such that, for no other $(w_1, w_2) \in B(w_0, q)$,

$$\pi u(w_1) + (1 - \pi)u(w_2) > \pi u(w_1^*) + (1 - \pi)u(w_2^*), \forall (\pi, u) \in [\underline{\pi}, \bar{\pi}] \times \mathcal{U}. \quad (10)$$

That is, there is no feasible portfolio that is strictly preferred to (w_1^*, w_2^*) .

To find the set of portfolios that solve the decision maker's problem, consider the following: Given the budget set $B(w_0, q)$, there corresponds to each $(\pi, u) \in \Pi \times \mathcal{U}$ an optimal portfolio position given by the solution to

$$\left(w_1^{(\pi, u)}(w_0, q), w_2^{(\pi, u)}(w_0, q) \right) := \arg \max_{(w_1, w_2) \in B(w_0, q)} [\pi u(w_1) + (1 - \pi)u(w_2)].$$

Denote the set of solutions by

$$W(w_0, q) = \left\{ \left(w_1^{(\pi, u)}(w_0, q), w_2^{(\pi, u)}(w_0, q) \right) \mid (\pi, u) \in [\underline{\pi}, \bar{\pi}] \times \mathcal{U} \right\}.$$

The set $W(w_0, q)$ captures the unpredictability corresponding to a decision maker characterized by $[\underline{\pi}, \bar{\pi}] \times \mathcal{U}$.

The necessary and sufficient condition for $(w_1, w_2) \in W(w_0, q)$ is:

$$\frac{\pi u'(w_1)}{(1 - \pi)u'(w_2)} = q$$

for some $(\pi, u) \in [\underline{\pi}, \bar{\pi}] \times \mathcal{U}$. Let $(\bar{w}_1(w_0, q), \underline{w}_2(w_0, q))$ and $(\underline{w}_1(w_0, q), \bar{w}_2(w_0, q))$ be implicitly defined by the equations

$$\frac{\bar{\pi}}{1 - \bar{\pi}} \sup_{u \in \mathcal{U}} \frac{u'(\bar{w}_1(w_0, q))}{u'(\underline{w}_2(w_0, q))} = q$$

and

$$\frac{\underline{\pi}}{1 - \underline{\pi}} \inf_{u \in \mathcal{U}} \frac{u'(\underline{w}_1(w_0, q))}{u'(\bar{w}_2(w_0, q))} = q.$$

Thus, $(\bar{w}_1(w_0, q), \underline{w}_2(w_0, q))$ is the point on the budget line at which the decision maker's largest marginal rate of substitution equals the slope of the budget line. Likewise, $(\underline{w}_1(w_0, q), \bar{w}_2(w_0, q))$ is the point on the budget line at which the decision maker's smallest marginal rate of substitution equals the slope of the budget line. Therefore, given $B(w_0, q)$, $(\bar{w}_1(w_0, q), \underline{w}_2(w_0, q))$ and $(\underline{w}_1(w_0, q), \bar{w}_2(w_0, q))$ are the extreme points of the set of portfolio positions in the set $W(w_0, q)$ that may be chosen by a preference relation \succ with MPEMU representation $[\underline{\pi}, \bar{\pi}] \times \mathcal{U}$.

If $\bar{\pi}/(1 - \bar{\pi}) < q$ then $w_1 < w_0 < w_2$, for all $(w_1, w_2) \in W(w_0, q)$ (that is, $W(w_0, q)$ is contained in the cone above the certainty line). If $\bar{\pi}/(1 - \bar{\pi}) > q > \underline{\pi}/(1 - \underline{\pi})$ then $(w_0, w_0) \in W(w_0, q)$. If $\underline{\pi}/(1 - \underline{\pi}) > q$ then $w_1 > w_0 > w_2$, for all $(w_1, w_2) \in W(w_0, q)$ (that is, $W(w_0, q)$ is contained in the cone below the certainty line). Figure 2 illustrates the unpredictability set for the case in which $\bar{\pi}/(1 - \bar{\pi}) > q > \underline{\pi}/(1 - \underline{\pi})$ so that $(w_0, w_0) \in W(w_0, q)$.


Proposition 4 shows that the level of unpredictability is higher the more incomplete a preference relation is.¹⁸

Proposition 4 *If preference relation \succ_1 on F displays greater belief and taste incompleteness than preference relation \succ_2 then $W_2(w_0, q) \subseteq W_1(w_0, q)$, for all $(w_0, q) \in R_{++}^2$.*

Now consider the effect of a change in relative prices to \hat{q} . Starting from (w_1^*, w_2^*) , the decision maker will change his portfolio position to some other $(\hat{w}_1^*, \hat{w}_2^*) \in$

¹⁸Chambers and Melkonyan (2020) show that when incompleteness gives rise to individuals having a continuum of allocations that they do not have a strict ranking of, trade among identical agents can arise.

Figure 2: Illustration of the Unpredictability Set $W(w_0, q)$ when $(w_0, w_0) \in W(w_0, q)$



$B(w_1^*, w_2^*, \hat{q})$ if and only if

$$\pi u(\hat{w}_1^*) + (1 - \pi)u(\hat{w}_2^*) > \pi u(w_1^*) + (1 - \pi)u(w_2^*), \forall (\pi, u) \in [\underline{\pi}, \bar{\pi}] \times \mathcal{U}.$$

Let

$$\frac{\bar{u}'(w_1^*)}{\bar{u}'(w_2^*)} := \sup_{u \in \mathcal{U}} \left\{ \frac{u'(w_1^*)}{u'(w_2^*)} \right\} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\underline{u}'(w_1^*)}{\underline{u}'(w_2^*)} := \inf_{u \in \mathcal{U}} \left\{ \frac{u'(w_1^*)}{u'(w_2^*)} \right\}.$$

It is easy to verify that if

$$\hat{q} \in \left[\frac{\underline{\pi}}{1 - \underline{\pi}} \frac{\underline{u}'(w_1^*)}{\underline{u}'(w_2^*)}, \frac{\bar{\pi}}{1 - \bar{\pi}} \frac{\bar{u}'(w_1^*)}{\bar{u}'(w_2^*)} \right] \quad (11)$$

then the decision maker will hold on to her position (w_1^*, w_2^*) . To see this, note that the left endpoint of the interval in (11) is the slope of the flattest of the decision maker's indifference curves through (w_1^*, w_2^*) , while the right endpoint of the interval is the slope of the steepest of the decision maker's indifference curves through (w_1^*, w_2^*) . The decision maker will hold on to his portfolio (w_1^*, w_2^*) as long as the slope of the budget line, given by \hat{q} , falls within this range.

Define the *measure of inertia* for \succ at (w_1^*, w_2^*) by the interval of prices at which the portfolio position is maintained. Formally,

$$I_{\succ}(w_1^*, w_2^*) = \left[\frac{\underline{\pi}}{1 - \underline{\pi}} \frac{\underline{u}'(w_1^*)}{\underline{u}'(w_2^*)}, \frac{\bar{\pi}}{1 - \bar{\pi}} \frac{\bar{u}'(w_1^*)}{\bar{u}'(w_2^*)} \right].$$

In particular, if the initial endowment (w_0, w_0) is the status quo, or default, portfolio then the measure of inertia at (w_0, w_0) is:

$$I_{\succ}(w_0, w_0) = \left[\frac{\underline{\pi}}{1 - \underline{\pi}}, \frac{\bar{\pi}}{1 - \bar{\pi}} \right]. \quad (12)$$

With only two states, if $E = \{s_1\}$, then $E^C = \{s_2\}$. Thus, if \succ_1 displays greater incompleteness than \succ_2 at $\{s_1\}$ then it displays greater incompleteness. Therefore, in this two-state economy the measure of inertia need not be indexed by the conditioning event.

We now investigate the comparative statics properties of the measure of inertia $I_{\succ}(w_1^*, w_2^*)$.

Proposition 5 *Let \succ_1 and \succ_2 be preference relations on R_+^2 . If \succ_1 displays greater belief and taste incompleteness than \succ_2 then $I_{\succ_1}(w_1^*, w_2^*) \supseteq I_{\succ_2}(w_1^*, w_2^*)$, for all (w_1^*, w_2^*) . Moreover, if $I_{\succ_1}(w_1^*, w_2^*) \supseteq I_{\succ_2}(w_1^*, w_2^*)$ for all (w_1^*, w_2^*) , then \succ_1 displays greater belief incompleteness than \succ_2 .*

Proposition 5 shows that a preference relation displaying greater belief and taste incompleteness exhibits a higher level of inertia. Thus, the portfolio position of a decision maker displaying greater belief and taste incomplete preferences is less sensitive to price fluctuations. If a preference relation \succ_1 displays either greater belief incompleteness or greater taste incompleteness than \succ_2 , but not both, then it is possible that \succ_2 displays greater overall incompleteness than \succ_1 , and thus it is possible for \succ_2 to display greater inertia than \succ_1 . However, if \succ_1 exhibits a higher level of inertia than \succ_2 at (w_0, w_0) , then it must be the case that it displays greater belief incompleteness. An immediate implication of Proposition 5 is that if the preference relations \succ_1 and \succ_2 display the same level of belief-incompleteness, then \succ_1 exhibits greater taste-incompleteness than \succ_2 if and only if $I_{\succ_1}(w_1^*, w_2^*) \supseteq I_{\succ_2}(w_1^*, w_2^*)$, for all (w_1^*, w_2^*) .

Remark: The analysis of portfolio choice bears some similarities to that of Dow and Werlang’s (1992) analysis of portfolio choice under Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) maxmin preferences. However, as they note, while the empirical implications of the Gilboa-Schmeidler model are broadly similar to those of Bewley’s Knightian uncertainty model, there is an important difference. For the incomplete preferences there is a “tendency not to trade, whereas in Gilboa-Schmeidler there is a tendency not to hold a position.” (Dow and Werlang [1992] p. 198.) Put differently, whereas the maxmin preferences are complete and display inertia on the certainty line, i.e. at the switching points of the ranking of the payoffs, in the general case of incomplete preferences, and in the particular case of Knightian uncertainty, the inertia, or “status quo bias” is displayed everywhere.

3.3 Completing the comparative incompleteness relations

Since our measures of incompleteness in Section 2 quantify incompleteness, they can be applied to rank the incompleteness of any two preference relations regardless of whether the noncomparable sets are ranked by set inclusion. The resulting “greater quantitative belief incompleteness” relations are themselves complete binary relations on the set of preference relations on F . Formally, we have the following definition:¹⁹

Definition 7

1. Preference relation \succ_1 displays greater quantitative belief incompleteness at E than preference relation \succ_2 if $m_b(E; \succ_1) \geq m_b(E; \succ_2)$.
2. On $\Delta\mathbb{R}$, preference relation \succ_1 displays greater quantitative taste incompleteness at p than preference relation \succ_2 if $m_t(p; \succ_1) \geq m_t(p; \succ_2)$.
3. Preference relation \succ_1 displays greater quantitative overall incompleteness at $x_E y$ than preference relation \succ_2 if $M(x_E y; \succ_1) \geq M(x_E y; \succ_2)$.

¹⁹The definitions of “strictly greater” incompleteness in this subsection are analogous to those in subsection 3.1 and thus omitted.

The comparative measure in part 1 of Definition 7 has the following intuitive interpretation: For a preference relation \succ_i , $i = 1, 2$, a bet on event E is non-comparable to lotteries with odds in $R^{\succ_i}(E)$. However, if the odds in the lottery are improved sufficiently, the lottery would become so attractive that a strict preference would emerge in favour of the lottery and the decision maker would no longer find the bet and the lottery incomparable. Now, consider any of the lotteries that are incomparable to the bet according to the preference relation \succ_1 , and consider an increase ϵ in the odds of winning, which is large enough to always break incomparability for all $r_1 \in R^{\succ_1}(E)$. If the same increase in odds will also always break incomparability for a preference relation \succ_2 , we conclude that \succ_2 is less incomplete than \succ_1 . In other words, it takes a smaller increase in odds for the preference relation \succ_2 to be able to compare the lottery and the bet and state a strict preference between the two objects than it does for the preference relation \succ_1 . The intuition behind parts 2 and 3 is similar: if any change in the certain monetary payoff that is large enough to break incomparability for preference relation \succ_1 always breaks incomparability for preference relation \succ_2 , then \succ_1 is more incomplete than \succ_2 .

Clearly, if a preference relation is more incomplete than another according to a set-inclusion definition of comparative incompleteness, it is also more incomplete according to the corresponding quantitative definition.

An immediate consequence of Definition 7 and Theorem 1 is that if preference relations \succ_1 and \succ_2 on F both admit MPEMU representations, then \succ_1 displays greater quantitative belief incompleteness at E than \succ_2 if and only if $\bar{\pi}_1(E) - \underline{\pi}_1(E) \geq \bar{\pi}_2(E) - \underline{\pi}_2(E)$. It displays strictly greater quantitative belief incompleteness at E if and only if the inequality is strict.

Theorem 2 below states that for low-variance lotteries p , \succ_1 displays greater quantitative taste incompleteness at p than \succ_2 if and only if, when evaluated at the mean of p , the largest difference in the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of risk aversion among the utility functions representing \succ_1 is greater than among the utility functions representing \succ_2 .

Theorem 2 *Suppose preference relations \succ_1 and \succ_2 on $\Delta\mathbb{R}$ both admit expected multi-utility representations. Then there exists $\epsilon > 0$ such that if $\sigma^2(p) \in (0, \epsilon)$, then*

\succ_1 displays greater quantitative taste incompleteness at p than \succ_2 if and only if

$$\max_{U \in \mathcal{U}_1} \left\{ -\frac{u''(\mu(p))}{u'(\mu(p))} \right\} - \min_{U \in \mathcal{U}_1} \left\{ -\frac{u''(\mu(p))}{u'(\mu(p))} \right\} \geq \max_{U \in \mathcal{U}_2} \left\{ -\frac{u''(\mu(p))}{u'(\mu(p))} \right\} - \min_{U \in \mathcal{U}_2} \left\{ -\frac{u''(\mu(p))}{u'(\mu(p))} \right\}.$$

It displays strictly greater quantitative taste incompleteness at p if and only if the inequality is strict.

Theorem 2 highlights the intuition that greater taste incompleteness is reflected in a larger range of risk attitudes.

4 Elicitation

The elicitation of the measures of incomplete beliefs $m_b(E; \succ)$, incomplete tastes $m_t(p; \succ)$, and overall incompleteness of preferences $M(x_E y; \succ)$ requires a formal model depicting the process of choosing among non-comparable alternatives. The elicitation mechanisms to be described and analyzed below presume that choice among non-comparable alternatives is random. More specifically, imagine a decision maker facing a choice among non-comparable alternatives and suppose that, before choosing, the decision maker receives a signal – a subconscious impulse or some exogenous information – drawn at random from a distribution function whose support is $[\underline{r}, \bar{r}]$ in the case of incomplete beliefs and $[\underline{c}, \bar{c}]$ in the case of incomplete tastes or overall incomplete preferences. In either case the merits of the alternatives are reassessed according to the value of the signal and the choice is made accordingly.²⁰ In what follows, we denote the signal’s cumulative distribution function by

²⁰This idea was formalized and the existence of such random selection process was proved in Karni and Safra (2016). The experiment of Cettolin and Riedl (2019) described in footnote 9, provides behavioral evidence for “signal-based” choice in the face of incompleteness. In particular, one interpretation of choosing a the mix option is that the subject is choosing to let the decision be determined by a signal produced by the random device used in the mixture operation. Danan (2010) models a two-stage decision-making process according to which, in the first stage, any two alternatives are either strictly ranked or judged as being equally valuable. If no judgment is rendered comparing their values, the two alternatives are determined to be noncomparable and one of them is chosen either by deliberate randomization or selectively. The resulting random choice behavior is based on a signal produced by a randomization device.

η . We begin with a discussion of an elicitation mechanism of $m_b(E; \succ)$ invoking a scheme due to Karni (2020b). We then extend this scheme to construct mechanisms for the elicitation of $M(x_E y; \succ)$ and $m_t(p; \succ)$.

4.1 Elicitation under Knightian uncertainty

There is a substantial body of literature dealing with incentive compatible mechanisms designed to elicit experts' subjective probabilities of uncertain events. Beginning with the work of Brier (1950) and Good (1952) it was followed by Savage (1971), Kadane and Winkler (1988), Grether (1981), Karni (2009) and others.²¹ Underlying all these mechanisms is the presumption that the experts' beliefs are depicted by a unique probability measure. Recently, however, incentive compatible mechanisms designed to elicit sets of priors or posterior probabilities have been proposed. Karni (2020b) proposed a modified proper scoring rule for the elicitation of the range, $R(E)$, of the probabilities of an event E . This mechanism allows a direct elicitation of the range of the beliefs of any preference relation that admits MPEMU representation.

To see how this mechanism works, fix an event E and let $[\underline{\pi}(E), \bar{\pi}(E)]$ denote the range of the subjective probabilities representing a subject's beliefs about the likelihood of E . Consider the following mechanism denoted \mathcal{M}_b : At time $t = 0$ the subject is instructed to report two numbers, $\underline{r}, \bar{r} \in [0, 1]$ with $\underline{r} \leq \bar{r}$. The subject is also given the following instructions about the payment scheme of the mechanism:

- In the interim period, $t = 1$, a random number, r , will be drawn from a uniform distribution on $[0, 1]$.
- The subject is awarded the bet $x_E y$ if $r \leq \underline{r}$ and the lottery $\ell(r; x, y)$ if $r \geq \bar{r}$, where $x > y$.
- If $r \in (\underline{r}, \bar{r})$, then the subject is allowed to choose between the bet $(x - \theta)_E (y - \theta)$ and the lottery $\ell(r; x - \theta, y - \theta)$, where $\theta > 0$.

In the last period, $t = 2$, after it is verified whether or not the event E occurred and the outcome of the lottery is revealed, all payments are made.

²¹For a recent review, see Chambers and Lambert (2017).

Karni (2020b) proves an elicitation theorem that implies the following result:

Theorem 3 *Given the mechanism \mathcal{M}_b , there is $\varepsilon > 0$ such that, for all $\theta \in [0, \varepsilon)$, the subject's unique dominant strategy is to report $\underline{r}(E) = \underline{\pi}(E)$ and $\bar{r}(E) = \bar{\pi}(E)$.*

Theorem 3 implies that the mechanism \mathcal{M}_b elicits the measure, $m_b(E; \succ)$, of incompleteness of the subject's beliefs. Moreover, the elicitation procedure does not depend on the values of x and y or the decision maker's utility function.²²

A natural question is how robust the proposed elicitation mechanism is to other manifestations of incompleteness, e.g., to how the incomplete preferences are assumed completed in choices. Consider, for instance, the completion implied by the maxmin expected utility of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). A bet $x_E y$ is valued by $U(x_E y) = \underline{\pi}u(x) + (1 - \underline{\pi})u(y)$, where $\underline{\pi}$ is the largest lower bound of the set of probabilities of the event E . Under the mechanism \mathcal{M}_b , procrastination is costly, and the subjects can assure themselves a payoff of $U(x_E y)$ by choosing $\bar{r} = \underline{r} = \underline{\pi}$. This is indeed the subject's dominant strategy in the game induced by the mechanism. Similar considerations apply to incompleteness that is due to tastes. Thus, no multi-prior model of behavior that also includes a completion will result in postponement of the decision.

Consider next the case in which the bet $x_E y$ constitutes the status quo and as such is chosen by default against any lottery $\ell(r; x, y)$ that is non-comparable to the bet. Let $\hat{r} = \inf\{r \in [0, 1] \mid \ell(r; x, y) \succ x_E y\}$. Again, there is a cost of delaying the decision: instead of getting the default bet $x_E y$, the subjects receive the bet $(x - \theta)_E (y - \theta)$. The subjects can avoid bearing the cost of delaying by choosing numbers $\bar{r} = \underline{r} = \hat{r} \in \Delta(\mathbb{R})$, thereby making sure that they are awarded the bet whenever it is not inferior to the lottery with winning probability \hat{r} .

In conclusion, the proposed mechanism is robust to several different completions of the incomplete preferences. Choice of lotteries that may result in delayed choices will not be observed when the incomplete preferences are completed by signal-based

²²Hill, Abdellaoui, and Colo (2021) provide a probability matching mechanism for eliciting multiple priors in the context of ambiguity aversion. Their elicitation schemes relies on the completeness of the preference relation. It does not include Bewley's Knightian uncertainty, or Machina and Schmeidler's probabilistic sophistication with incomplete preferences.

random choice or maxmin expected utility, or when choice of the status quo by default govern the subject's choice behavior.

4.2 Elicitation of the measure of overall incompleteness

Fix a bet $x_E y$ on E , and recall that $M(x_E y; \succ) = \bar{c}(x_E y; \succ) - \underline{c}(x_E y; \succ)$. Consider the following mechanism denoted \mathcal{M}_o : At time $t = 0$, the subject is asked to report two numbers, $\underline{z}, \bar{z} \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}] \supset [x, y]$ such that $\underline{z} \leq \bar{z}$. The subject is also given the following instructions about the payment scheme of the mechanism:

- In the interim period, $t = 1$, a random number, z , will be drawn from a uniform distribution on $[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]$.
- The subject is awarded the bet $x_E y$ if $z \leq \underline{z}$ and the outcome z if $z \geq \bar{z}$.
- If $z \in (\underline{z}, \bar{z})$, then the subject is allowed to choose between the bet $(x - \theta)_E (y - \theta)$ and the outcome $z - \theta$, where $\theta > 0$.

In the last period, $t = 2$, after it is verified whether or not the event E obtained, all payments are made.

Theorem 4 *Given \mathcal{M}_o , there is $\varepsilon > 0$ such that, for all $\theta \in [0, \varepsilon)$, the subject's unique dominant strategy is to report $\underline{z} = \underline{c}(x_E y; \succ)$ and $\bar{z} = \bar{c}(x_E y; \succ)$.*

4.3 Elicitation of the measure of incomplete risk attitudes

Given \succ on $\Delta\mathbb{R}$ and $p = (x_1, p_1; \dots, x_n, p_n) \in \Delta\mathbb{R}$, recall that $m_t(p, \succ) = \bar{c}^\succ(p) - \underline{c}^\succ(p)$. Consider the following mechanism denoted \mathcal{M}_t : At time $t = 0$, the subject is asked to report two numbers, $\underline{z}, \bar{z} \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}] \supset \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$ such that $\underline{z} \leq \bar{z}$. The subject is also given the following instructions about the payment scheme of the mechanism:

- In the interim period, $t = 1$, a random number, z , will be drawn from a uniform distribution on $[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]$.
- The subject is awarded the lottery p if $z \leq \underline{z}$ and the outcome z if $z \geq \bar{z}$.

- If $\underline{z} < \bar{z}$ and $z \in (\underline{z}, \bar{z})$, then the subject is allowed to choose between the lottery $p' = (x_1 - \theta, p_1; \dots, x_n - \theta, p_n)$ and the outcome $z - \theta$, where $\min\{x_1, \dots, x_n\} > \theta > 0$.

In the last period, the outcome of the lottery is revealed, and all payments are made.

Theorem 5 *Given M_t , there is $\varepsilon > 0$ such that, for all $\theta \in [0, \varepsilon)$, the subject's unique dominant strategy is to report $\underline{z} = \underline{c}(p)$ and $\bar{z} = \bar{c}(p)$.*

The proof is by the same argument as the proof of the preceding theorem.²³

5 Concluding Remarks

Whether it is belief, taste, or overall incompleteness, our characterizations of the relation “more incomplete than” are preference-based. Indecision due to tastes is a reflection of incompleteness of risk attitudes. To grasp this, consider two preference relations, \succ^i , $i = 1, 2$, displaying incomplete risk attitudes. Let w denote the level of wealth, and denote the sets of utility functions that figure in the representations of the two preference relations by $\mathcal{U}_1 = \{w, -e^{-\gamma_1 w}\}$ and $\mathcal{U}_2 = \{w, -e^{-\gamma_2 w}\}$, where $0 < \gamma_2 < \gamma_1$. Note that each of the two representations involves exactly two utility functions, one displaying risk neutrality and the other risk aversion, and that the two relations are distinguished by the most risk averse of their risk attitudes.²⁴ Since $\gamma_1 > \gamma_2$, the preference relation \succ^1 displays greater taste incompleteness than \succ^2 . Formally, $p \succ_2 \delta_c$ if and only if $\sum_{w \in \text{supp} p} p(w)w \geq c$ and $\sum_{w \in \text{supp} p} p(w)(-e^{-\gamma_2 w}) \leq -e^{-\gamma_2 c}$. These inequalities imply that $\sum_{w \in \text{supp} p} p(w)w \geq c$ and $\sum_{w \in \text{supp} p} p(w)(-e^{-\gamma_1 w}) \leq -e^{-\gamma_1 c}$, which is equivalent to $x_E y \succ_1 \delta_c$. Hence,

²³Danan and Siegelmeier (2006) conducted an experiment to test whether the subjects' preferences under risk display incompleteness. In their experimental design, subjects are allowed to choose between a lottery, a sure monetary payoff, and the flexibility to make their choice at a later date, in which case they pay a small penalty. The majority of the subjects chose the third option, thereby exhibiting incompleteness.

²⁴Here, we depart briefly from the assumption that \mathcal{U} is a convex set, with the purpose of illustrating a point related to that.

$x_E y \succ_2 \delta_c$ implies that $x_E y \succ_1 \delta_c$. In other words, a lottery p that is noncomparable to the certain amount c according to \succ^2 is also noncomparable according to \succ^1 , but not vice versa. The degree of incompleteness is a property of the preference relation. Hence, it is the range of noncomparable risk attitudes and not the number of functions in the set that represents them that is the measure of taste incompleteness. Recall that a representation with the set of utility functions in \mathcal{U}_1 characterizes the same preferences and incompleteness of risk attitudes as a representation with a set of utility functions given by the convex hull of \mathcal{U}_1 .

Invoking our measures of incompleteness, the simple portfolio choice problem in Section 3.2 illustrates the usefulness of the measures in deriving comparative statics implications. The behavioral implications of the greater quantitative incompleteness measures in subsection 3.3 are somewhat weaker. For instance, in the case of portfolio selection, under Knightian uncertainty, the level of inertia and unpredictability displayed by \succ_1 exceeds that displayed by \succ_2 but not necessarily in response to the same price variations or over the same price range, respectively. Similar observations apply to risk-attitude and overall incompleteness. Greater incompleteness according to our quantitative measures imply higher levels of inertia and unpredictability, but not necessarily over the same price range. One advantage of the quantitative measures of comparative incompleteness is that, for a given event, bet, or lottery, the quantitative “more incomplete than” relation is itself a complete relation, as opposed to the corresponding set inclusion relation, which is incomplete.

Let Υ_1 and Υ_2 be two sets of priors representing the incompleteness of preference relations \succ_1 and \succ_2 , respectively. It is worth emphasizing that our definition of the degree of belief incompleteness does not imply that if \succ_1 and \succ_2 display equal degrees of belief incompleteness then $\Upsilon_1 = \Upsilon_2$. To see this, consider the following example of Amarante and Maccheroni (2006). Let $\Upsilon_1 = \text{co}\{(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}, 0), (\frac{4}{6}, \frac{1}{6}, \frac{1}{6})\}$ and $\Upsilon_2 = \{(\frac{3+t}{6}, \frac{3-t-s}{6}, \frac{s}{6}) \mid s, t \in [0, 1]\}$. Then, it is easy to verify that $\bar{\pi}_1(E) - \underline{\pi}_1(E) = \bar{\pi}_2(E) - \underline{\pi}_2(E)$ for all $E \in 2^S$. Thus, according to our definition, the two preference relations display the same degree of belief incompleteness and yet $\Upsilon_1 \neq \Upsilon_2$.

In recent work, Chambers, Melkonyan, and Quiggin (2021) also consider incomplete preferences over uncertain outcomes. They define functions of two acts that measure the decision-maker’s willingness to pay for, respectively accept, a switch

between the two acts. For incomplete preferences, the willingness to pay in one direction is potentially different from the willingness to accept in the other direction. The functions characterize preferences and can be used to determine whether two acts are non-comparable, and whether preferences are complete.

An important question that is beyond the scope of this work is how information affects the level of incompleteness. Here, the preference relations being compared are the prior and posterior preference relations. Addressing this issue requires a procedure for updating the set of priors. The example below illustrates that, updating all the priors in the set using Bayes' rule, becoming better informed about an event E makes the beliefs at E more complete but may or may not make the beliefs at some other event become more complete.

Example: An urn contains balls that come in three colors, blue, green, and yellow denoted B , G , and Y , respectively. Consider a decision maker who displays Knightian uncertainty and suppose that she holds the following set of beliefs: $\{(\pi_B, \pi_G, \pi_Y) | \pi_B \in [\frac{1}{3}, \frac{2}{3}], \pi_G \in [0, \frac{1}{3}], \pi_Y \in [\frac{1}{3}, \frac{2}{3}], \pi_B + \pi_G + \pi_Y = 1\}$. The measure of belief incompleteness of the decision maker's prior preferences at event B is $m_b(B, \succ) = \frac{1}{3}$. Assume that when she receives new information, the decision maker updates her beliefs prior by prior, using Bayes' rule.

Suppose now that the decision maker is informed that the urn contains no yellow balls. Applying Bayesian updating, the posterior range of probabilities of the event B is $[\frac{1}{2}, 1]$. Hence, $m_b(B, \succ') = \frac{1}{2}$, where \succ' denotes the updated preferences given the information $\neg Y$. If, instead the decision maker learns that the urn contains no green balls, the range of her posterior probabilities that a ball is blue is $[\frac{1}{3}, \frac{2}{3}]$, so $m_b(B, \succ'') = \frac{1}{3}$, where \succ'' denotes the updated preferences given the information $\neg G$. Hence, according to our quantitative measure of belief incompleteness, information that the ball is not yellow makes the decision maker's beliefs more incomplete at B , while information that the ball is not green does not change her belief incompleteness at B . In either case, however, the information about an event makes the beliefs about that event more complete.

As the example above and the asset market application in Section 3.2 show, both the set inclusion and quantitative measures of comparative incompleteness have

their merits. Also, when preferences have MPEMU representations, our measures of incompleteness have intuitive interpretations in terms of the decision makers' beliefs and risk attitudes. To the extent to which measurement paves the road to knowledge as expressed by Lord Kelvin, "When you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something about it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meager and unsatisfactory kind," this paper, by suggesting measures of incompleteness, is a contribution towards the analysis of a variety of questions that have to do with the behavioral implications of incomplete preferences in a manner analogous to the use of measures of risk aversion.

6 Appendix

6.1 Proof of Theorem 1:

Applied to bets and the constant lottery acts, the representation in (9) implies that,

$$x_E y \succ \ell(r; x, y)$$

if and only if

$$U(\delta_x)\pi(E) + U(\delta_y)(1 - \pi(E)) > U(\delta_x)r + U(\delta_y)(1 - r), \forall (\pi, U) \in \Pi \times \mathcal{U}.$$

By definition of the set $R^\succ(E)$ in (2), it is the case that for any $r \in R^\succ(E)$,

$$\exists (\tilde{\pi}, U) \in \Pi \times \mathcal{U} \text{ such that } (\tilde{\pi}(E) - r) [U(\delta_x) - U(\delta_y)] \leq 0, \quad (13)$$

and

$$\exists (\hat{\pi}, U) \in \Pi \times \mathcal{U} \text{ such that } (\hat{\pi}(E) - r) [U(\delta_x) - U(\delta_y)] \geq 0. \quad (14)$$

But $x > y$. Hence, monotonicity with respect to first-order stochastic dominance implies that $U(\delta_x) - U(\delta_y) > 0$. Thus, the expression in (13) is equivalent to

$$\exists \tilde{\pi} \in \Pi \text{ such that } \tilde{\pi}(E) \leq r, \quad (15)$$

while the expression in (16) is equivalent to

$$\exists \hat{\pi} \in \Pi \text{ such that } \hat{\pi}(E) \geq r. \quad (16)$$

Since (15) holds for all $r \in R^\succ(E)$, $\underline{\pi}(E) \leq \underline{r}^\succ(E)$. Suppose $\underline{\pi}(E) < \underline{r}^\succ(E)$. Then $(\underline{\pi}(E) - \underline{r}^\succ(E)) [U(\delta_x) - U(\delta_y)] < 0$, for all $U \in \mathcal{U}$. This contradicts that $x_E y \succ \ell(r; x, y)$ for $r < \underline{r}^\succ(E)$. It follows that $\underline{\pi}(E) = \underline{r}^\succ(E)$. A similar argument shows that $\bar{\pi}(E) = \bar{r}^\succ(E)$. Therefore,

$$[\underline{\pi}(E), \bar{\pi}(E)] = [\underline{r}^\succ, \bar{r}^\succ]. \quad (17)$$

It follows that $m_b(E; \succ) = \bar{\pi}(E) - \underline{\pi}(E)$. Since x , y , and U do not figure in this expression, $m_b(E; \succ)$ is independent of x , y , and U . ■

6.2 Proof of Proposition 1

The proof follows the idea of Pratt (1964). Let \tilde{U} be the utility function in \mathcal{U} associated with the smallest risk premium $\underline{\xi}^\succ(\ell(r; x, y)) \equiv \underline{\xi}_{r; x, y}^\succ$ and let \tilde{u} be the corresponding Bernoulli utility function. For ease of notation, we suppress the dependency of $\mu_r(x, y)$ on x and y in the intermediate steps below and simply write μ_r . By definition of the risk premium,

$$\tilde{U}(\delta_{\mu_r - \underline{\xi}_{r; x, y}^\succ}) = \tilde{U}(\delta_{\bar{c}^\succ(\ell(r; x, y))}) = \tilde{U}(\ell(r; x, y)).$$

Written in terms of the Bernoulli utility function \tilde{u} , we have that

$$\tilde{u}(\mu_r - \underline{\xi}_{r; x, y}^\succ) = E_{\ell(r; x, y)}[\tilde{u}(z)], \quad (18)$$

where $E_{\ell(r; x, y)}$ denotes the expectation w.r.t. the distribution $\ell(r; x, y)$. Expanding the left-hand-side of (18) around μ_r gives

$$\tilde{u}(\mu_r - \underline{\xi}_{r; x, y}^\succ) = \tilde{u}(\mu_r) - \tilde{u}'(\mu_r) \underline{\xi}_{r; x, y}^\succ + O((\underline{\xi}_{r; x, y}^\succ)^2) \quad (19)$$

while expanding the right-hand-side of (18) around μ_r gives

$$E_{\ell(r; x, y)}[\tilde{u}(z)] = E_{\ell(r; x, y)} \left[\tilde{u}(\mu_r) + \tilde{u}'(\mu_r)(z - \mu_r) + \frac{1}{2} \tilde{u}''(\mu_r)(z - \mu_r)^2 \right] + o(\sigma_r^2(x, y)) \quad (20)$$

By (18), the right-hand-sides of (19) and (20) are equal, which results in

$$\underline{\xi}^\succ(\ell(r; x, y)) = -\frac{1}{2} \frac{\tilde{u}''(\mu_r(x, y))}{\tilde{u}'(\mu_r(x, y))} \sigma_r^2(x, y) + o(\sigma_r^2(x, y)) \quad (21)$$

Now, let \hat{U} be the utility function in \mathcal{U} associated with the largest risk premium $\bar{\xi}^{\succ}(\ell(r; x, y))$ and let \hat{u} be the corresponding Bernoulli utility function. By steps similar to those for $\underline{\xi}^{\succ}(\ell(r; x, y))$, we obtain

$$\bar{\xi}^{\succ}(\ell(r; x, y)) = -\frac{1}{2} \frac{\hat{u}''(\mu_r(x, y))}{\hat{u}'(\mu_r(x, y))} \sigma_r^2(x, y) + o(\sigma_r^2(x, y)) \quad (22)$$

Note that we must have that

$$\hat{U} = \arg \max_{U \in \mathcal{U}} -\frac{u''(\mu_r(x, y))}{u'(\mu_r(x, y))} \text{ and } \tilde{U} = \arg \min_{U \in \mathcal{U}} -\frac{u''(\mu_r(x, y))}{u'(\mu_r(x, y))}.$$

Hence, using the expressions in (21) and (22) the definition of $m_t(p; \succ)$ gives that for small $x - y$, the measure of taste incompleteness of \succ at $\ell(r; x, y)$ satisfies

$$\begin{aligned} m_t(\ell(r; x, y); \succ) &= \left[\sup_{U \in \mathcal{U}} \left\{ -\frac{u''(\mu_r(x, y))}{u'(\mu_r(x, y))} \right\} - \inf_{U \in \mathcal{U}} \left\{ -\frac{u''(\mu_r(x, y))}{u'(\mu_r(x, y))} \right\} \right] \frac{\sigma_r^2(x, y)}{2} \\ &\quad + o(\sigma_r^2(x, y)). \end{aligned}$$

Claim: $\max \left(-\frac{u''(\mu_r(x, y))}{u'(\mu_r(x, y))} \in \mathbb{R} \mid U \in \mathcal{U} \right)$ and $\min \left(-\frac{u''(\mu_r(x, y))}{u'(\mu_r(x, y))} \in \mathbb{R} \mid U \in \mathcal{U} \right)$ exist.

Proof of claim: Fix $\mu_r(x, y) = w$, then for any $U \in \mathcal{U}$,

$$-u''(w)/u'(w) = 2\xi^u(\ell(r; x, y))/\sigma_r^2(x, y) + o(\sigma_r^2(x, y)).$$

By monotonicity of preferences, $\xi^u(\ell(r; x, y)) = w - c_r(x, y) \in [y - x, x - y]$, for all $U \in \mathcal{U}$. Thus, $\{-u''(w)/u'(w) \mid U \in \mathcal{U}\}$ is a bounded nonempty subset of \mathbb{R} . Hence, $\sup\{-u''(w)/u'(w) \mid U \in \mathcal{U}\}$ and $\inf\{-u''(w)/u'(w) \mid U \in \mathcal{U}\}$ exist.

To show that the sup is attained, we begin by showing that $p \succsim q$ if and only if there is $U \in \mathcal{U}$ such that $u(p - q) = 0$. Suppose that $p \succsim q$ then, by the representation there are \bar{U} and \underline{U} in \mathcal{U} such that $\bar{U}(p) \geq \bar{U}(q)$ and $\underline{U}(p) \leq \underline{U}(q)$. If any of these weak inequalities is an equality then we are done. Assume therefore that $\bar{U}(p) > \bar{U}(q)$ and $\underline{U}(p) < \underline{U}(q)$ then there exists $\lambda \in (0, 1)$ such that

$$U_\lambda(p) := \lambda \bar{U}(p) + (1 - \lambda) \underline{U}(p) = \lambda \bar{U}(q) + (1 - \lambda) \underline{U}(q) := U_\lambda(q)$$

Hence, $u_\lambda(p - q) = 0$ and, by the convexity of \mathcal{U} , $U_\lambda \in \mathcal{U}$.

To show the other direction, suppose that there is a function $\hat{U} \in \mathcal{U}$ such that $\hat{u}(p - q) = 0$. Then, it follows directly that neither $U(p) > U(q)$ nor $U(p) < U(q)$, for all $U \in \mathcal{U}$. Hence, by the representation $\neg(p \succ q)$ and $\neg(q \succ p)$ and, by definition, $p \asymp q$.

Next we show that the set \mathcal{U} is closed. Let U be a limit point of \mathcal{U} . Fix $p \in \Delta\mathbb{R}^m$. Then, by the above argument, for all $q \in \Delta\mathbb{R}^m$, $q \asymp p$ implies that there exists $\hat{U} \in \mathcal{U}$ such that for the corresponding Bernoulli utility function, $\hat{u}(p - q) = 0$. Consider a sequence $(q^n) \subset \Delta\mathbb{R}^m$ such that $q^n \asymp p$ for all n , that converges to q , where $q \neq p$. By the above argument, there exists a sequence of utility functions $(U^n) \subset \mathcal{U}$ such that $u^n(p - q^n) = 0$. Since weak inequalities are preserved in the limit, $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} u^n(p - q^n) = 0$. Also, whenever (U^n) is a convergent sequence, $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} u^n(p - q^n) = u(p - q) = 0$. Hence, any limit point $U \in \mathcal{U}$. Since the sequence was chosen arbitrarily, \mathcal{U} includes all its limit points and therefore it is closed. Hence, $\{-u''(w)/u'(w) \mid U \in \mathcal{U}\}$ is closed. Thus, the $\sup\{-u''(w)/u'(w) \mid U \in \mathcal{U}\} = \max\{-u''(w)/u'(w) \mid U \in \mathcal{U}\}$.

By the same argument the min also exists. ■

6.3 Proof of Proposition 2

By definition, $\bar{c}^\succ(\ell(r; x, y) \geq \underline{c}^\succ(\ell(r; x, y)))$ for any $r \in [0, 1]$, and $\bar{r}^\succ(E) \geq \underline{r}^\succ(E)$ for any E . By first order stochastic dominance, $\bar{c}^\succ(\ell(\bar{r}^\succ(E); x, y)) \geq \bar{c}^\succ(\ell(\underline{r}^\succ(E); x, y))$ and $\underline{c}^\succ(\ell(\bar{r}^\succ(E); x, y)) \geq \underline{c}^\succ(\ell(\underline{r}^\succ(E); x, y))$. Therefore, we must have that

$$\bar{c}(x_E y; \succ) = \bar{c}^\succ(\ell(\bar{r}^\succ(E); x, y))$$

and

$$\underline{c}(x_E y; \succ) = \underline{c}^\succ(\ell(\underline{r}^\succ(E); x, y)).$$

To ease notation in the derivations below, let $\underline{\mu} = \underline{r}^\succ(E)x + (1 - \underline{r}^\succ(E))y$, that is, the expected value of the bet according to the least favorable distribution in $R^\succ(E)$ and let $\bar{\mu} = \bar{r}^\succ(E)x + (1 - \bar{r}^\succ(E))y$, that is, the expected value of the bet according to the most favorable distribution in $R^\succ(E)$.

Let \tilde{U} be the utility function in \mathcal{U} associated with the smallest risk premium at $\ell(\bar{r}^\succ(E); x, y)$ and let \tilde{u} be the corresponding Bernoulli utility function. By definition

of the risk premium,

$$\tilde{U}(\delta_{\bar{\mu} - \underline{\xi}^{\succ}(E); x, y}) = \tilde{U}(\delta_{\bar{c}^{\succ}(\ell(\bar{r}^{\succ}(E); x, y))}) = \tilde{U}(\ell(\bar{r}^{\succ}(E); x, y)).$$

Similar to expression (18) in the proof of Proposition 1, we can rewrite the expression in terms of \tilde{u} . Expanding around $\bar{\mu}$ and following the steps as in (19) through (21) we obtain that

$$\underline{\xi}^{\succ}(\ell(\bar{r}^{\succ}(E); x, y)) = -\frac{1}{2} \frac{\tilde{u}''(\bar{\mu})}{\tilde{u}'(\bar{\mu})} \sigma_{\bar{r}^{\succ}(E)}^2(x, y) + o(\sigma_{\bar{r}^{\succ}(E)}^2(x, y)) \quad (23)$$

Now, let \hat{U} be the utility function in \mathcal{U} associated with the largest risk premium at $\ell(\underline{r}^{\succ}(E); x, y)$ and let \hat{u} be the corresponding Bernoulli utility function. By expanding around $\underline{\mu}$ and equating terms as in the steps above, we obtain

$$\bar{\xi}^{\succ}(\ell(\underline{r}^{\succ}(E); x, y)) = -\frac{1}{2} \frac{\hat{u}''(\underline{\mu})}{\hat{u}'(\underline{\mu})} \sigma_{\underline{r}^{\succ}(E)}^2(x, y) + o(\sigma_{\underline{r}^{\succ}(E)}^2(x, y)). \quad (24)$$

Note that we must have that

$$\hat{U} = \arg \max_{U \in \mathcal{U}} -\frac{u''(\underline{\mu})}{u'(\underline{\mu})} \text{ and } \tilde{U} = \arg \min_{U \in \mathcal{U}} -\frac{u''(\bar{\mu})}{u'(\bar{\mu})}.$$

By definition,

$$M(x_E y; \succ) = \bar{c}(x_E y; \succ) - \underline{c}(x_E y; \succ) = \bar{\mu} - \underline{\mu} + \bar{\xi}^{\succ}(\ell(\underline{r}^{\succ}(E); x, y)) - \underline{\xi}^{\succ}(\ell(\bar{r}^{\succ}(E); x, y)).$$

Note that $\sigma_r^2(x, y) = r(1-r)(x-y)^2$, so $o(\sigma_r^2(x, y)) = o((x-y)^2)$.

By Theorem 1, $\underline{\pi}(E) = \underline{r}^{\succ}(E)$ and $\bar{\pi}(E) = \bar{r}^{\succ}(E)$. Hence, plugging in expressions (23) and (24) gives that for small $x - y$, the measure of overall incompleteness of \succ at $x_E y$ satisfies

$$\begin{aligned} M(x_E y; \succ) &= (\bar{\pi}(E) - \underline{\pi}(E))(x - y) \\ &+ \frac{1}{2} \left[\max_{U \in \mathcal{U}} \left\{ -\frac{u''(\mu_{\underline{\pi}(E)}(x, y))}{u'(\mu_{\underline{\pi}(E)}(x, y))} \right\} \sigma_{\underline{\pi}(E)}^2(x, y) - \min_{U \in \mathcal{U}} \left\{ -\frac{u''(\mu_{\bar{\pi}(E)}(x, y))}{u'(\mu_{\bar{\pi}(E)}(x, y))} \right\} \sigma_{\bar{\pi}(E)}^2(x, y) \right] \\ &+ o((x - y)^2). \end{aligned} \quad (25)$$

■

6.4 Proof of Proposition 3:

Consider a bet $x_E y$. Since \succ_1 displays greater belief incompleteness than \succ_2 , we have that for any E , $[\underline{\pi}_2(E), \bar{\pi}_2(E)] \subseteq [\underline{\pi}_1(E), \bar{\pi}_1(E)]$. Since \succ_1 displays greater taste incompleteness than \succ_2 , we have that for any p , $[\underline{c}^{\succ_2}(p), \bar{c}^{\succ_2}(p)] \subseteq [\underline{c}^{\succ_1}(p), \bar{c}^{\succ_1}(p)]$. It follows that

$$\bar{c}^{\succ_1}(\bar{\pi}_1(E)) \geq \underline{c}^{\succ_2}(\underline{\pi}_2(E)). \quad (26)$$

As argued in the beginning of the proof of Proposition 2, it must be that for any \succ ,

$$\bar{c}(x_E y; \succ) = \bar{c}^\succ(\ell(\bar{r}^\succ(E); x, y))$$

and

$$\underline{c}(x_E y; \succ) = \underline{c}^\succ(\ell(\underline{r}^\succ(E); x, y)).$$

Thus, $O^{\succ_2}(x_E y) \subseteq O^{\succ_1}(x_E y)$. ■

6.5 Proof of Proposition 4:

Suppose that a preference relation \succ_1 displays greater belief and taste incompleteness than preference relation \succ_2 . Greater belief incompleteness is equivalent to $\Pi_2 \subseteq \Pi_1$. Therefore,

$$\underline{\pi}_1 \leq \underline{\pi}_2 \leq \bar{\pi}_2 \leq \bar{\pi}_1. \quad (27)$$

For $i = 1, 2$, define \bar{u}_i and \underline{u}_i , respectively, by

$$\bar{u}_i \equiv \arg \max_{u \in \mathcal{U}_i} \frac{\bar{\pi}_i}{1 - \bar{\pi}_i} \frac{u'(\bar{w}_1^i(w_0, q))}{u'(\underline{w}_2^i(w_0, q))} \quad (28)$$

and

$$\underline{u}_i \equiv \arg \min_{u \in \mathcal{U}_i} \frac{\underline{\pi}_i}{1 - \underline{\pi}_i} \frac{u'(\underline{w}_1^i(w_0, q))}{u'(\bar{w}_2^i(w_0, q))}. \quad (29)$$

Note that the utility functions defined in (28) and (29) are independent of the values of $\bar{\pi}$ and $\underline{\pi}$. Normalize \bar{u}_i , $i = 1, 2$, so that $\bar{u}_1(\bar{w}_1(w_0, q)) = \bar{u}_2(\bar{w}_1(w_0, q))$ and $\bar{u}_1(\underline{w}_2(w_0, q)) = \bar{u}_2(\underline{w}_2(w_0, q))$, which can be done since the utility functions are unique up to positive affine transformations.

Greater taste incompleteness implies that $C^{\succ^2}(p) \subseteq C^{\succ^1}(p)$, for all $p \in \Delta(X)$. Therefore, $\underline{c}^{\succ^1}(p) \leq \underline{c}^{\succ^2}(p) \leq \bar{c}^{\succ^2}(p) \leq \bar{c}^{\succ^1}(p)$, for all $p \in \Delta(\mathbb{R})$. Thus, by definition, $\underline{\xi}^{\succ^1}(p) \leq \underline{\xi}^{\succ^2}(p)$ and $\bar{\xi}^{\succ^2}(p) \leq \bar{\xi}^{\succ^1}(p)$, for all $p \in \Delta\mathbb{R}$. In particular, $\bar{c}^{\succ^1}(\ell(\pi; \bar{w}_1(w_0, q), \underline{w}_2(w_0, q))) \geq \bar{c}^{\succ^2}(\ell(\pi; \bar{w}_1(w_0, q), \underline{w}_2(w_0, q)))$, for all $\pi \in [0, 1]$. Note that for all $\pi \in [0, 1]$, $\bar{c}^{\succ^i}(\ell(\pi; \bar{w}_1(w_0, q), \underline{w}_2(w_0, q)))$ is the certainty equivalent associated with the utility function \bar{u}_i .

Since the utility functions \bar{u}_1 and \bar{u}_2 intersect at both $\bar{w}_1(w_0, q)$ and $\underline{w}_2(w_0, q)$, the fact that $C^{\succ^2}(\ell(\pi; \bar{w}_1(w_0, q), \underline{w}_2(w_0, q))) \subseteq C^{\succ^1}(\ell(\pi; \bar{w}_1(w_0, q), \underline{w}_2(w_0, q)))$, implies, by Theorem 1 of Pratt (1964), that there is a monotonic increasing and concave function, \bar{T} such that $\bar{u}_2 = \bar{T} \circ \bar{u}_1$.

Moreover, since $\underline{c}^{\succ^1}(\ell(\pi; \underline{w}_1(w_0, q), \bar{w}_2(w_0, q))) \leq \underline{c}^{\succ^2}(\ell(\pi; \underline{w}_1(w_0, q), \bar{w}_2(w_0, q)))$, by the same argument there is a monotonic increasing and concave function, \underline{T} , such that $\underline{u}_1 = \underline{T} \circ \underline{u}_2$.

Note that if $\bar{w}_1^i(w_0, q) \geq \underline{w}_2^i(w_0, q)$, then $(\bar{w}_1^i(w_0, q), \underline{w}_2^i(w_0, q))$ is a bet on state 1 and $\bar{c}(\bar{w}_1^i(w_0, q)_E \underline{w}_2^i(w_0, q); \succ_i) = \bar{c}(\bar{\pi}_i; \succ_i)$, while $\underline{c}(\bar{w}_1^i(w_0, q)_E \underline{w}_2^i(w_0, q); \succ_i) = \underline{c}(\underline{\pi}_i; \succ_i)$.

By definition of $(\bar{w}_1^i(w_0, q), \underline{w}_2^i(w_0, q))$, the expression in (28) equals q for $i = 1, 2$. Using this and that $\bar{u}_2 = \bar{T} \circ \bar{u}_1$, we have

$$\frac{\bar{\pi}_1}{1 - \bar{\pi}_1} \frac{\bar{u}'_1(\bar{w}_1^1(w_0, q))}{\bar{u}'_1(\underline{w}_2^1(w_0, q))} = \frac{\bar{\pi}_2}{1 - \bar{\pi}_2} \frac{\bar{u}'_2(\bar{w}_1^2(w_0, q))}{\bar{u}'_2(\underline{w}_2^2(w_0, q))} = \frac{\bar{\pi}_2}{1 - \bar{\pi}_2} \frac{\bar{T}'(\bar{u}_1(\bar{w}_1^2(w_0, q)))\bar{u}'_1(\bar{w}_1^2(w_0, q))}{\bar{T}'(\bar{u}_1(\underline{w}_2^2(w_0, q)))\bar{u}'_1(\underline{w}_2^2(w_0, q))}. \quad (30)$$

By (27), $\frac{\bar{\pi}_2}{1 - \bar{\pi}_2} \leq \frac{\bar{\pi}_1}{1 - \bar{\pi}_1}$. If $\bar{w}_1^2(w_0, q) \geq \underline{w}_2^2(w_0, q)$, then the monotonicity of u_1 and the concavity of \bar{T} imply that $\bar{T}'(\bar{u}_1(\bar{w}_1^2(w_0, q))) \leq \bar{T}'(\bar{u}_1(\underline{w}_2^2(w_0, q)))$. Hence, the equality in (30) implies that

$$\frac{\bar{u}'_1(\bar{w}_1^1(w_0, q))}{\bar{u}'_1(\underline{w}_2^1(w_0, q))} \leq \frac{\bar{u}'_1(\bar{w}_1^2(w_0, q))}{\bar{u}'_1(\underline{w}_2^2(w_0, q))}.$$

That is, the marginal rate of substitution corresponding to \bar{u}_1 is larger at $(\bar{w}_1^2(w_0, q), \underline{w}_2^2(w_0, q))$ than it is at $(\bar{w}_1^1(w_0, q), \underline{w}_2^1(w_0, q))$. Hence, $\bar{w}_1^1(w_0, q) \geq \bar{w}_1^2(w_0, q)$ and $\underline{w}_2^1(w_0, q) \leq \underline{w}_2^2(w_0, q)$.

By definition of $(\underline{w}_1^i(w_0, q), \bar{w}_2^i(w_0, q))$, the expression in (29) equals q for $i = 1, 2$. Using this and that $\underline{u}_1 = \underline{T} \circ \underline{u}_2$, we have

$$\frac{\pi_2}{1 - \pi_2} \frac{u'_2(\underline{w}_1^2(w_0, q))}{u'_2(\bar{w}_2^2(w_0, q))} = \frac{\pi_1}{1 - \pi_1} \frac{u'_1(\underline{w}_1^1(w_0, q))}{u'_1(\bar{w}_2^1(w_0, q))} = \frac{\pi_1}{1 - \pi_1} \frac{\underline{T}'(\underline{u}_2(\underline{w}_1^1(w_0, q)))u'_2(\underline{w}_1^1(w_0, q))}{\underline{T}'(\underline{u}_2(\bar{w}_2^1(w_0, q)))u'_2(\bar{w}_2^1(w_0, q))}. \quad (31)$$

By (27), $\frac{\pi_2}{1 - \pi_2} \geq \frac{\pi_1}{1 - \pi_1}$. If $\bar{w}_2^1(w_0, q) \leq \underline{w}_1^1(w_0, q)$, then the monotonicity of and the concavity of \underline{T} imply that $\underline{T}'(\underline{u}_2(\underline{w}_1^1(w_0, q))) \leq \underline{T}'(\underline{u}_2(\bar{w}_2^1(w_0, q)))$. Hence, equality in (31) implies that

$$\frac{u'_2(\underline{w}_1^2(w_0, q))}{u'_2(\bar{w}_2^2(w_0, q))} \leq \frac{u'_2(\underline{w}_1^1(w_0, q))}{u'_2(\bar{w}_2^1(w_0, q))}.$$

That is, the marginal rate of substitution corresponding to \bar{u}_1 is larger at $(\underline{w}_1^1(w_0, q), \bar{w}_2^1(w_0, q))$ than at $(\underline{w}_1^2(w_0, q), \bar{w}_2^2(w_0, q))$. It follows that $\underline{w}_1^1(w_0, q) \leq \underline{w}_1^2(w_0, q)$ and $\bar{w}_2^1(w_0, q) \geq \bar{w}_2^2(w_0, q)$.

Apply the same logic to the case in which $\underline{w}_1^2(w_0, q) \leq \bar{w}_2^2(w_0, q)$ and $\underline{w}_2^1(w_0, q) \geq \bar{w}_1^1(w_0, q)$, and use that if $\bar{w}_1^i(w_0, q) \leq \underline{w}_2^i(w_0, q)$, then $(\bar{w}_1^i(w_0, q), \underline{w}_2^i(w_0, q))$ is a bet on state 2 so $\bar{c}(\bar{w}_1^i(w_0, q)_E \underline{w}_2^i(w_0, q); \succ_i) = \bar{c}(1 - \pi_i; \succ_i)$, while $\underline{c}(\bar{w}_1^i(w_0, q)_E \underline{w}_2^i(w_0, q); \succ_i) = \underline{c}(1 - \bar{\pi}_i; \succ_i)$. Then we get $\underline{w}_1^1(w_0, q) \geq \underline{w}_1^2(w_0, q)$ and $\bar{w}_1^1(w_0, q) \geq \bar{w}_1^2(w_0, q)$. \blacksquare

6.6 Proof of proposition 5:

Suppose that \succ_1 displays greater incompleteness than \succ_2 . Let \bar{u}_i and \underline{u}_i be given by (28) and (29), respectively, for $i = 1, 2$. By greater belief incompleteness, (27) holds.

Assume that $w_1^* > w_2^*$. Greater taste incompleteness implies that $C^{\succ_2}(p) \subseteq C^{\succ_1}(p)$, for all $p \in \Delta\mathbb{R}$. Thus, $\underline{c}^{\succ_1}(p) \leq \underline{c}^{\succ_2}(p) \leq \bar{c}^{\succ_2}(p) \leq \bar{c}^{\succ_1}(p)$, for all $p \in \Delta\mathbb{R}$. Hence, by definition, $\underline{\xi}^{\succ_1}(p) \leq \underline{\xi}^{\succ_2}(p)$ and $\bar{\xi}^{\succ_2}(p) \leq \bar{\xi}^{\succ_1}(p)$, for all $p \in \Delta(\mathbb{R})$. Therefore, by Theorem 1 in Pratt (1964), there exist monotonic increasing and concave functions \bar{T} and \underline{T} such that $\bar{u}_2 = \bar{T} \circ \bar{u}_1$ and $\underline{u}_1 = \underline{T} \circ \underline{u}_2$. Therefore,

$$\frac{\bar{\pi}_2}{1 - \bar{\pi}_2} \frac{\bar{u}'_2(w_1^*)}{\bar{u}'_2(w_2^*)} = \frac{\bar{\pi}_2}{1 - \bar{\pi}_2} \frac{\bar{T}'(\bar{u}_1(w_1^*))\bar{u}'_1(w_1^*)}{\bar{T}'(\bar{u}_1(w_2^*))\bar{u}'_1(w_2^*)} \leq \frac{\bar{\pi}_1}{1 - \bar{\pi}_1} \frac{\bar{u}'_1(w_1^*)}{\bar{u}'_1(w_2^*)}. \quad (32)$$

and

$$\frac{\pi_1}{1 - \pi_1} \frac{u'_1(w_1^*)}{u'_1(w_2^*)} = \frac{\pi_1}{1 - \pi_1} \frac{\underline{T}'(\underline{u}_2(w_1^*))u'_2(w_1^*)}{\underline{T}'(\underline{u}_2(w_2^*))u'_2(w_2^*)} \leq \frac{\pi_2}{1 - \pi_2} \frac{u'_2(w_1^*)}{u'_2(w_2^*)}, \quad (33)$$

where concavity of \bar{T} and \underline{T} is used to conclude that $\frac{T'(u_2(w_1^*))}{T'(u_2(w_2^*))} \leq 1$ and $\frac{\bar{T}'(\bar{u}_1(w_1^*))}{\bar{T}'(\bar{u}_1(w_2^*))} \leq 1$ and using the relationships in (27). It follows from (32) and (33) that $I_{\succ_1}(w_1^*, w_2^*) \supseteq I_{\succ_2}(w_1^*, w_2^*)$.

The proof for the case in which $w_1^* \leq w_2^*$ is by a similar argument, noting that when $w_1^* \leq w_2^*$, we are considering a bet on state 2.

To show that if $I_{\succ_1}(w_1^*, w_2^*) \supseteq I_{\succ_2}(w_1^*, w_2^*)$ for all (w_1^*, w_2^*) then \succ_1 displays greater belief incompleteness than \succ_2 , suffices it to observe that $I_{\succ_i}(w_0, w_0) = \left[\frac{\pi_i}{1-\pi_i}, \frac{\bar{\pi}_i}{1-\bar{\pi}_i} \right]$ for $i = 1, 2$. Thus, if $(w_1^*, w_2^*) = (w_0, w_0)$, then $\neg \left(\left[\frac{\pi_2}{1-\pi_2}, \frac{\bar{\pi}_2}{1-\bar{\pi}_2} \right] \subseteq \left[\frac{\pi_1}{1-\pi_1}, \frac{\bar{\pi}_1}{1-\bar{\pi}_1} \right] \right)$ implies $\neg (I_{\succ_1}(w_0, w_0) \supseteq I_{\succ_2}(w_0, w_0))$. ■

6.7 Proof of Theorem 2:

Observe that the proof of Proposition 1 does not hinge on the support of the lottery being binary, with the understanding that for a general p the local requirement is that we let all values in the support be close to the mean. We therefore have that

$$m_t(p; \succ_i) = \left[\max_{U \in \mathcal{U}_i} \left\{ -\frac{u''(\mu(p))}{u'(\mu(p))} \right\} - \min_{U \in \mathcal{U}_i} \left\{ -\frac{u''(\mu(p))}{u'(\mu(p))} \right\} \right] \frac{\sigma^2(p)}{2} + o(\sigma^2(p)), \quad (34)$$

for $i = 1, 2$. Suppose now that $m_t(p; \succ_1) > m_t(p; \succ_2)$. By (34),

$$\begin{aligned} & \left[\max_{U \in \mathcal{U}_1} \left\{ -\frac{u''(\mu(p))}{u'(\mu(p))} \right\} - \min_{U \in \mathcal{U}_1} \left\{ -\frac{u''(\mu(p))}{u'(\mu(p))} \right\} \right] \frac{\sigma^2(p)}{2} \\ & - \left[\max_{U \in \mathcal{U}_2} \left\{ -\frac{u''(\mu(p))}{u'(\mu(p))} \right\} - \min_{U \in \mathcal{U}_2} \left\{ -\frac{u''(\mu(p))}{u'(\mu(p))} \right\} \right] \frac{\sigma^2(p)}{2} \\ & = m_t(p; \succ_1) - m_t(p; \succ_2) + o(\sigma^2(p)) \end{aligned} \quad (35)$$

Therefore, for any positive value of $m_t(p; \succ_1) - m_t(p; \succ_2)$, there exists $\epsilon > 0$ such that for all $0 < \sigma^2(p) < \epsilon$, $o(\sigma^2(p)) < m_t(p; \succ_1) - m_t(p; \succ_2)$. Then (35) implies that

$$\left[\left[\max_{U \in \mathcal{U}_1} \left\{ -\frac{u''(\mu(p))}{u'(\mu(p))} \right\} - \min_{U \in \mathcal{U}_1} \left\{ -\frac{u''(\mu(p))}{u'(\mu(p))} \right\} \right] - \left[\max_{U \in \mathcal{U}_2} \left\{ -\frac{u''(\mu(p))}{u'(\mu(p))} \right\} - \min_{U \in \mathcal{U}_2} \left\{ -\frac{u''(\mu(p))}{u'(\mu(p))} \right\} \right] \right] \frac{\sigma^2(p)}{2}$$

is also positive. Since $\sigma^2(p) > 0$, it then follows that

$$\left[\max_{U \in \mathcal{U}_1} \left\{ -\frac{u''(\mu(p))}{u'(\mu(p))} \right\} - \min_{U \in \mathcal{U}_1} \left\{ -\frac{u''(\mu(p))}{u'(\mu(p))} \right\} \right] > \left[\max_{U \in \mathcal{U}_2} \left\{ -\frac{u''(\mu(p))}{u'(\mu(p))} \right\} - \min_{U \in \mathcal{U}_2} \left\{ -\frac{u''(\mu(p))}{u'(\mu(p))} \right\} \right].$$

A similar argument can be used to show the other direction as well. ■

6.8 Proof of Theorem 4

Given x_{Ey} and $\theta > 0$, suppose that the subject reports $\bar{z} > \bar{c}(x_{Ey}; \succ)$. If $z \leq \underline{c}(x_{Ey}; \succ)$ or $z \geq \bar{z}$ then the subject's payoffs are the same regardless of whether he reports \bar{z} or $\bar{c}(x_{Ey}; \succ)$. If $z \in (\bar{c}(x_{Ey}; \succ), \bar{z})$, the subject's payoff is a choice between the bet $(x - \theta)_E(y - \theta)$ and the outcome $z - \theta$; had he reported $\bar{c}(x_{Ey}; \succ)$ instead of \bar{z} his payoff would have been z . But $z > z - \theta$ implies that $\delta_z \succ \delta_{z-\theta}$ and, since $z > \bar{c}(x_{Ey}; \succ)$, implies $\delta_z \succ x_{Ey} \succ (x - \theta)_E(y - \theta)$, the subject is worse off reporting \bar{z} instead of $\bar{c}(x_{Ey}; \succ)$.

Suppose that the subject reports $\underline{z} < \underline{c}(x_{Ey}; \succ)$. If $z \leq \underline{z}$ or $z \geq \underline{c}(x_{Ey}; \succ)$ the subject's payoffs are the same regardless of whether he reports \underline{z} or $\underline{c}(x_{Ey}; \succ)$. If $r \in (\underline{z}, \underline{c}(x_{Ey}; \succ))$, the subject's payoff is a choice between $(x - \theta)_E(y - \theta)$ and the outcome $r - \theta$; had he reported $\underline{c}(x_{Ey}; \succ)$ instead of \underline{z} his payoff would have been x_{Ey} . By stochastic dominance, $x_{Ey} \succ (x - \theta)_E(y - \theta)$, and $r < \underline{c}(x_{Ey}; \succ)$ implies that $x_{Ey} \succ \delta_r \succ \delta_{r-\theta}$. Thus the subject is worse off reporting \underline{z} instead of $\underline{c}(x_{Ey}; \succ)$.

Suppose that the subject reports $\bar{z} \in (\underline{c}(x_{Ey}; \succ), \bar{c}(x_{Ey}; \succ))$. If $r \in [\bar{z}, \bar{c}(x_{Ey}; \succ)]$, the subject's payoff is r , whereas had he reported $\bar{c}(x_{Ey}; \succ)$ he would have the opportunity to choose between the bet $(x - \theta)_E(y - \theta)$ and the outcome $r - \theta$. If the signal, c , indicates that $(x - \theta)_E(y - \theta) \prec \delta_c$, where $c \leq r - \theta$, the subject would choose the outcome $r - \theta$ and if the signal indicates that $(x - \theta)_E(y - \theta) \succ \delta_c$, $c \geq r - \theta$, indicating that the value of the bet $(x - \theta)_E(y - \theta)$ exceeds $r - \theta$, the subject would choose the bet. Thus, the subject's payoff is

$$\Psi(\theta) := \eta(r - \theta)u(r - \theta) + \int_{r-\theta}^{\bar{c}(x_{Ey}; \succ)} u(c)d\eta(c).$$

But

$$\eta(r)u(r) + \int_r^{\bar{c}(x_{Ey}; \succ)} u(c)d\eta(c) > u(r).$$

Hence, by continuity of $\Psi(\theta)$, there is $\varepsilon > 0$ such that, for all $\theta \in [0, \varepsilon)$, $\Psi(\theta) > u(r)$. Thus, reporting $\bar{z} < \bar{c}(x_{Ey}; \succ)$ is dominated by reporting truthfully, $\bar{z} = \bar{c}(x_{Ey}; \succ)$. By similar argument, $\underline{z} \not\prec \underline{c}(x_{Ey}; \succ)$. Hence, the dominant strategy is to report truthfully, that is, $\underline{z} = \underline{c}(x_{Ey}; \succ)$. ■

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