

# The Distribution of Wealth and the Marginal Propensity to Consume

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## Why Worry About the MPC ( $\equiv \kappa$ )?

Nobody trying to make a forecast in 2008-2010 would ask:

- Big 'stimulus' tax cuts
- Keynesian multipliers should be big in liquidity trap
- Crude Keynesianism: Transitory tax cut multiplier is  $1/(1 - \kappa) - 1$ 
  - If  $\kappa = 0.5$  then multiplier is  $\approx 1-3$
  - If  $\kappa = 0.15$  then multiplier is only  $\approx 0.45$

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  - If  $\kappa = 0.75$  then multiplier is  $4-1=3$   
(same size multiplier of  $\kappa$  are the same)
  - If  $\kappa = 0.05$  then multiplier is only  $\approx 0.05$   
(this is about 1% size of  $\kappa$  in RBC models)

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(this is about 3 times as big as the MPC)
  - If  $\kappa = 0.05$  then multiplier is only  $\approx 0.05$   
(this is about 1/20 as big as the MPC multiplier)

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# Our Claim: Heterogeneity Is Key To Modeling the MPC

- Clarida (2012): Missing this is why DSGE models failed
- Theory: HH c function is *concave* in market resources  $m$ 
  - HHs with the same  $m$  behave very differently
  - In relation to the MPC, or shock

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  - In addition to the MPC,  $m$  affects
    - $\gamma$  (slope of  $c(m)$ )
    - $\beta$  (risk aversion of the value function)
    - $\alpha$  (risk aversion of the utility function)

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
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# Consumption Concavity and Wealth Heterogeneity



# Microeconomics of Consumption

## Since Friedman's (1957) PIH:

- $c$  chosen optimally:  
*Want to smooth  $c$  in light of  $y$  fluctuations*
- Single most important thing to get right is **income dynamics!**
- With smooth  $c$ , income dynamics **drive everything!**
  - Saving/dissaving: Depends on whether  $\mathbb{E}[\Delta y] \uparrow$  or  $\mathbb{E}[\Delta y] \downarrow$
  - Wealth distribution depends on integration of saving
- **Cardinal sin:** Assume crazy income dynamics
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# Our Goal: “Serious” Microfoundations

Requires three changes to well-known Krusell-Smith model:

- Sensible microeconomic income process
- Finite lifetimes
- Match wealth *distribution*

How achieved by introducing permanent income  
View it as a way for doing *basic* microfoundations

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## To-Do List

- 1 Calibrate realistic income process
- 2 Match empirical wealth distribution
- 3 Back out optimal  $C$  and MPC out of transitory income
- 4 Is MPC in line with empirical estimates?

### Our Question:

Does a model that matches micro facts about income dynamics and wealth distribution give different (and more plausible) answers than KS to macroeconomic questions (say, about the response of consumption to fiscal 'stimulus')?

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## Friedman (1957): Permanent Income Hypothesis

$$Y_t = P_t + T_t$$

$$C_t = P_t$$

### Progress since then

- **Micro data:** Friedman description of income shocks works well
- **Math:** Friedman's words well describe optimal solution to dynamic stochastic optimization problem of impatient consumers with geometric discounting under CRRA utility with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk calibrated using these micro income dynamics (!)

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## Our (Micro) Income Process

Idiosyncratic (household) income process is logarithmic Friedman:

$$\begin{aligned}y_{t+1} &= p_{t+1}\xi_{t+1}W \\ p_{t+1} &= p_t\psi_{t+1}\end{aligned}$$

$p_t$  = permanent income

$\xi_t$  = transitory income

$\psi_{t+1}$  = permanent shock

$W$  = aggregate wage rate

## Further Details of Income Process

Modifications from Carroll (1992):

Trans income  $\xi_t$  incorporates **unemployment insurance**:

$$\begin{aligned}\xi_t &= \mu \text{ with probability } u \\ &= (1 - \tau)\bar{\ell}\theta_t \text{ with probability } 1 - u\end{aligned}$$

$\mu$  is UI when unemployed

$\tau$  is the rate of tax collected for the unemployment benefits



## Model Without Aggr Uncertainty: Decision Problem

$$\begin{aligned}
 v(m_t) &= \max_{\{c_t\}} u(c_t) + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \psi_{t+1}^{1-\rho} v(m_{t+1}) \right] \\
 \text{s.t.} \\
 a_t &= m_t - c_t \\
 a_t &\geq 0 \\
 k_{t+1} &= a_t / (\delta \psi_{t+1}) \\
 m_{t+1} &= (\bar{\gamma} + r) k_{t+1} + \xi_{t+1} \\
 r &= \alpha a (K / \bar{\ell} L)^{\alpha-1}
 \end{aligned}$$

Variables normalized by  $p_t W$

# What Happens After Death?

- You are replaced by a new agent whose permanent income is equal to the population mean
- Prevents the population distribution of permanent income from spreading out

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## Ergodic Distribution of Permanent Income

Exists, if death eliminates permanent shocks:

$$\delta \mathbb{E}[\psi^2] < 1.$$

Holds.

Population mean of  $p^2$ :

$$\mathbb{M}[p^2] = \left( \frac{D}{1 - \delta \mathbb{E}[\psi^2]} \right)$$

- $\beta, \rho, \alpha, \delta, \bar{\ell}, \mu$ , and  $u$  taken from JEDC special volume
- Key new parameter values:

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# Annual Income, Earnings, or Wage Variances

	$\sigma_{\psi}^2$	$\sigma_{\xi}^2$
Our parameters	0.016	0.010
Carroll (1992)	0.016	0.010
Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004)	0.008–0.026	0.316
Meghir and Pistaferri (2004)*	0.031	0.032
Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010)	0.011	—
Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008a)*	0.010–0.030	0.029–0.055
Implied by KS-JEDC	0.000	0.038
Implied by Castaneda et al. (2003)	0.028	0.004

\* Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) and Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008a) assume that the transitory component is serially correlated (an MA process), and report the variance of a subelement of the transitory component.  $\sigma_{\xi}^2$  for these articles are calculated using their MA estimates.



# Typology of Our Models

## Three Dimensions

### 1 Discount Factor $\beta$

- ' $\beta$ -Point' model: Single discount factor
- ' $\beta$ -Dist' model: Uniformly distributed discount factor

### 2 Aggregate Shocks

- (No)
- Krusell-Smith
- Friedman/Buffer Stock

### 3 Empirical Wealth Variable to Match

- Net Worth
- Liquid Financial Assets

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### ① Discount Factor $\beta$

- ' $\beta$ -Point' model: Single discount factor
- ' $\beta$ -Dist' model: Uniformly distributed discount factor

### ② Aggregate Shocks

- (No)
- Krusell–Smith
- Friedman/Buffer Stock

### ③ Empirical Wealth Variable to Match

- Net Worth
- Liquid Financial Assets



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## Dimension 1: Estimation of $\beta$ -Point and $\beta$ -Dist

### ' $\beta$ -Point' model

- 'Estimate' single  $\beta$  by matching the capital–output ratio

### ' $\beta$ -Dist' model—Heterogenous Impatience

- Assume uniformly distributed  $\beta$  across households
- Estimate the band  $[\beta - \nabla, \beta + \nabla]$  by minimizing distance between model ( $w$ ) and data ( $\omega$ ) net worth held by the top 20, 40, 60, 80%

$$\min_{\{\beta, \nabla\}} \sum_{i=20,40,60,80} (w_i - \omega_i)^2,$$

s.t. aggregate net worth–output ratio matches the steady-state value from the perfect foresight model

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
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## Results: Wealth Distribution

	Micro Income Process					U.S. Data*
	Friedman/Buffer Stock		KS-JEDC	KS-Orig <sup>◇</sup>		
	Point Discount Factor <sup>‡</sup>	Uniformly Distributed Discount Factors*	Our solution	Hetero		
	$\beta$ -Point	$\beta$ -Dist				
Top 1%	10.	26.4	3.	3.0	24.0	29.6
<b>Top 20%</b>	55.1	83.1	39.7	35.0	88.0	79.5
<b>Top 40%</b>	76.9	93.7	65.4			92.9
<b>Top 60%</b>	90.1	97.4	83.5			98.7
<b>Top 80%</b>	97.5	99.3	95.1			100.4

## Results: Wealth Distribution



## Dimension 2.a: Adding KS Aggregate Shocks

### Model with KS Aggregate Shocks: Assumptions

- Only two aggregate states (good or bad)
- Aggregate productivity  $a_t = 1 \pm \Delta^a$
- Unemployment rate  $u$  depends on the state ( $u^g$  or  $u^b$ )

Parameter values for aggregate shocks from Krusell and Smith (1998)

Parameter	Value
$\Delta^a$	0.01
$u^g$	0.04
$u^b$	0.10
Agg transition probability	0.125

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## Solution Method

- HH needs to forecast  $k_t \equiv K_t/\bar{\ell}_t L_t$  since it determines future interest rates and wages.
- Two broad approaches
  - Direct computation of the system's law of motion  
Advantage: fast, accurate
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
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# Marginal Propensity to Consume & Net Worth



## Results: MPC (in Annual Terms)

	Micro Income Process		
	Friedman/Buffer Stock		KS-JEDC
	$\beta$ -Point	$\beta$ -Dist	Our solution
Overall average	0.1	0.23	0.05
By wealth/permanent income ratio			
Top 1%	0.06	0.05	0.04
Top 20%	0.06	0.06	0.04
Top 40%	0.06	0.08	0.04
Top 60%	0.07	0.12	0.04
Bottom 1/2	0.13	0.35	0.05
By employment status			
Employed	0.09	0.2	0.05
Unemployed	0.23	0.53	0.06

## Estimates of MPC in the Data: $\sim 0.2\text{--}0.6$

Authors	Consumption Measure			Horizon *	Event/Source
	Nondurables	Durables	Total PCE		
Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008b) <sup>‡</sup>	0.05				Estimation
Coronado, Lupton, and Sheiner (2005)			0.36	1 Year	2003 Tax
Hausman (2012)			0.6–0.75	1 Year	1936 Vete
Jappelli and Pistaferri (2013)	0.48				Italy, 201
Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2009)	~ 0.25			3 Months	2003 Chil
Lusardi (1996) <sup>‡</sup>	0.2–0.5				Estimatio
Parker (1999)	0.2			3 Months	Estimatio
Parker, Souleles, Johnson, and McClelland (2011)	0.12–0.30		0.50–0.90	3 Months	2008 Eco
Sahm, Shapiro, and Slemrod (2010)			~ 1/3	1 Year	2008 Eco
Shapiro and Slemrod (2009)			~ 1/3	1 Year	2008 Eco
Souleles (1999)	0.045–0.09	0.29–0.54	0.34–0.64	3 Months	Estimatio
Souleles (2002)	0.6–0.9			1 Year	The Reag of the Ea

Notes:  $\dagger$ : elasticity.

## Dimension 2.b: Adding FBS Aggregate Shocks

### Friedman/Buffer Stock Shocks

- Motivation:

More plausible and tractable aggregate process, also simpler

- Eliminates 'good' and 'bad' aggregate state
- Aggregate production function:  $K_t^\alpha (L_t)^{1-\alpha}$

Assume that the aggregate shock is a random walk  

$$\Psi_t = \Psi_{t-1} + \epsilon_t$$

$$\Xi_t = \Xi_{t-1} + \eta_t$$
where  $\epsilon_t$  is the aggregate transitory shock

- Parameter values estimated from U.S. data:

Description	Parameter	Value
Variance of Log $\Psi_t$	$\sigma_\Psi^2$	0.00004
Variance of Log $\Xi_t$	$\sigma_\Xi^2$	0.00001

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  - $L_t = P_t \Xi_t$
  - $P_t$  is aggregate permanent productivity
  - $P_{t+1} = P_t \Psi_{t+1}$
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# Results

## Our/FBS model

- A few times faster than solving KS model
- The results are similar to those under KS aggregate shocks
- Average MPC
  - Matching net worth: 0.2
  - Matching liquid financial assets: 0.42



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
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## Dimension 3: Matching Net Worth vs Liquid Financial (and Retirement) Assets



## Match Net Worth vs Liquid Financial Assets

- Buffer stock saving driven by accumulation of **liquidity**
- May make more sense to match liquid (and retirement) assets (Hall (2011), Kaplan and Violante (2011))
- Average MPC Increases Substantially: 0.19  $\uparrow$  0.39

	$\beta$ -Dist	
	Net Worth	Liq Fin and Ret Assets
Overall average	0.23	0.44
By wealth/permanent income ratio		
Top 1%	0.05	0.12
Top 20%	0.06	0.13
Top 40%	0.08	0.2
Top 60%	0.12	0.28
Bottom 1/2	0.35	0.59

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
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## Distribution of MPCs

Wealth heterogeneity translates into heterogeneity in MPCs



# Conclusions

- Definition of “serious” microfoundations: Model that matches
  - Income Dynamics
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- The model produces **more plausible implications about MPC.**
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