

Implications of Wealth Heterogeneity For Macroeconomics

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FOMC vs DSGE

Biggest Discrepancy: Uncertainty

- Consumers
- Corporate Investment
- Banks, Financial Markets
- Europe

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“Stochastic” in DSGE Deserves Scare Quotes

- The stochastic “shocks” are silly:
 - Shocks, universal declines in productivity, technology
 - Shocks, arbitrary changes in household preferences
 - Monetary policy moves gone wild
- The shocks are much too small
 - Variance of household-specific shocks is 100 times larger
 - Anybody who has ever used micro data knows this

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 - Different outcomes for *ex ante* similar people
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- Both kinds of heterogeneity are large and matter (differently)

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Models with serious treatment of heterogeneity:

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- Are Testable
- Provide sensible answers to questions like those on first slide
- Should Replace “Representative Agent” Models

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 - *Why?*
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- Procedure:
 - Calibrate income uncertainty using household-level data
 - Solve for optimal consumption behavior given preferences
 - Simulate to generate wealth distribution
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 - MPC should be between 0.2 and 0.7

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


Figure: Consumption and the m Distribution (ratios to quarterly income)

Table: MPC's When Model Matches Net Worth Versus Liquid Assets

	Measure of Wealth Matched	
	Net Worth	Liquid Assets
Overall average	0.19	0.68
Wealth Percentile		
Top 1%	0.05	0.23
Top 20%	0.06	0.28
Top 40%	0.07	0.39
Top 60%	0.09	0.50
Bottom 1/2	0.28	0.83

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