

Sticky Expectations and Consumption Dynamics

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Consumption Dynamics

Macro

- Theory: Uninsurable Risk Is Unimportant
- Evidence: Consumption Is Too Smooth
- Conclusion: Habits ≈ 0.75

Micro

- Theory: Uninsurable Risk Is Essential
- Evidence: Habits $\neq 0.75$ Rejectable With Confidence $= \infty$
- $\text{var}(\Delta \log c) \approx 100 \text{var}(\Delta \log C)$

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Proposal: Macro (Not Micro) Inattention

- Income Has Idiosyncratic And Aggregate Components
- Idiosyncratic Component Is Perfectly Observed
- Aggregate Component Is Stochastically Observed

Not *ad hoc*

- Identical: Mankiw and Reis (2002), Carroll (2003)
- Similar: Sims (2003), Woodford (2001), Reis (2003)

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Why This Is Plausible

Idiosyncratic Variability Is $\sim 100\times$ Bigger

- If Same Equation Estimated on Micro vs Macro Data
- Pervasive Lesson Of All Micro Data

Utility Cost Of Inattention

- Micro: Critical (and Easy) To Notice You're Unemployed
- Unlike Pischke (1995)
- Macro: Not Critical To Instantly Notice If $U \uparrow$

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Related Literature

- Smoothness: Campbell and Deaton (1989), Pischke (1995), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)
- Inattention: Pischke (1995); Mankiw and Reis (2002); Reis (2003); Sims (2003)
- Macro Habits: Abel (1990); Constantinides (1990); many recent papers
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Quadratic Utility Benchmark

Total Wealth:

$$\mathbf{z}_{t+1} = (\mathbf{z}_t - \mathbf{c}_t)R + \zeta_{t+1}, \quad (1)$$

Euler Equation:

$$\mathbf{u}'(\mathbf{c}_t) = R\beta \mathbf{E}_t[\mathbf{u}'(\mathbf{c}_{t+1})], \quad (2)$$

Random Walk:

$$\Delta \mathbf{c}_{t+1} = \epsilon_{t+1}. \quad (3)$$

Expected wealth:

$$\mathbf{z}_t = \mathbf{E}_t[\mathbf{z}_{t+1}] = \mathbf{E}_t[\mathbf{z}_{t+2}] \dots \quad (4)$$

Sticky Expectations

- Consumer Who Happens To Update At t and $t + n$

$$\begin{aligned}
 \mathbf{c}_t &= (r/R)\mathbf{z}_t \\
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 \mathbf{c}_{t+n-1} &= \mathbf{c}_t.
 \end{aligned}$$

- Implies that $\Delta^n \mathbf{z}_{t+n} \equiv \mathbf{z}_{t+n} - \mathbf{z}_t$ is white noise
- So individual \mathbf{c} is RW across updating periods:

$$\mathbf{c}_{t+n} - \mathbf{c}_t = (r/R) \underbrace{(\mathbf{z}_{t+n} - \mathbf{z}_t)}_{\Delta^n \mathbf{z}_{t+n}} \quad (5)$$

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Sticky Expectations

- Pop normed to one, uniformly dist on $[0, 1]$

$$\mathbf{C}_t = \int_0^1 \mathbf{c}_{t,i} di.$$

- Calvo (1983) Type Updating Of Expectations:
 - Probability $\Pi = 0.25$
- Economy Composed Of Many Sticky Consumers:

$$\Delta \mathbf{C}_{t+1} \approx \underbrace{(1 - \Pi)}_{=0.75} \Delta \mathbf{C}_t + \epsilon_{t+1} \quad (6)$$

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One More Ingredient ...

- Distinguish idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks
 - Frictionless observation of idiosyncratic shocks
 - True RW with respect to these
 - Sticky observation of aggregate shocks
- Result:
 - Idiosyncratic Δc dominated by frictionless RW part
 - Aggregate ΔC highly serially correlated
 - Law of large numbers: idiosyncratic part vanishes

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Muth–Pischke/Lucas/Kalman

Muth (1960)-Pischke (1995)/Lucas (1973) - Kalman filter

- All you can see is Y
 - Lucas: Can't distinguish agg. from idio.
 - Muth-Pischke: Can't distinguish tran from perm
- Here: Can see own circumstances perfectly
- Only the (tiny) aggregate part is hard to see
- But *can't* permit signal extraction wrt aggregate
 - Signal extraction wrt agg implies agg random walk
- Will return to this below

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Serious Model

Partial Equilibrium/Small Open Economy

- CRRA Utility
- Idiosyncratic Shocks Calibrated From Micro Data
- Aggregate Shocks Calibrated From Macro Data
- No Liquidity Constraints
- Mildly Impatient Consumers

DSGE Model

- Same!

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Income Process

- Individual's labor productivity is

$$l_{t+1} = \overbrace{\theta_{t+1} \Theta_{t+1}}^{\equiv \theta_{t+1}} \underbrace{p_{t+1} P_{t+1}}_{\equiv p_{t+1}} \quad (7)$$

- Idiosyncratic and aggregate p evolve according to

$$p_{t+1} = p_t \psi_{t+1} \quad (8)$$

$$P_{t+1} = P_t \Psi_{t+1} \quad (9)$$

- $\mathbf{E}_t[\theta_{t+n}] = \mathbf{E}_t[\Theta_{t+n}] = \mathbf{E}_t[\psi_{t+n}] = \mathbf{E}_t[\Psi_{t+n}] = 1 \quad \forall n > 0$

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Resources

- Market resources:

$$\mathbf{m}_{t+1} = \underbrace{\mathcal{W}_{t+1} \ell_{t+1}}_{\equiv \mathbf{y}_{t+1}} + \underbrace{R_{t+1}}_{1+r_{t+1}} \mathbf{k}_{t+1} \quad (10)$$

- 'Assets': Unspent resources

$$\mathbf{a}_t = \mathbf{m}_t - \mathbf{c}_t \quad (11)$$

- Capital transition depends on prob of survival Ω :

$$\mathbf{k}_{t+1} = \mathbf{a}_t / \Omega \quad (12)$$

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Frictionless Solution

- Assume constant \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{W}
- Normalize everything by $p_t P_t$ e.g. $m_t = \mathbf{m}_t / p_t P_t$
- $c(m_t)$ is the function that solves

$$v(m_t) = \max_c \{u(c) + \beta \mathbf{E}_t[\psi_{t+1}^{1-\rho} v(m_{t+1})]\}$$

- Level of consumption given by

$$\mathbf{c}_t = c(m_t) \mathbf{p}_t.$$

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Blanchard (1985) Mortality

- Agent survives from t to $t + 1$ with probability Ω

$$p_{t+1,i} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{for newborns} \\ p_{t,i}\psi_{t+1,i} & \text{for survivors,} \end{cases}$$

- Implies steady-state distribution of p with variance:

$$\text{var}(p) = \left(\frac{1 - \Omega}{1 - \Omega E[\psi^2]} - 1 \right)$$

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Blanchard (1985) Insurance

$$\mathbf{k}_{t+1,i} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if agent at } i \text{ dies, is replaced by a newborn} \\ \mathbf{a}_{t,i} \tau / \Omega & \text{if agent at } i \text{ survives} \end{cases}$$

Implies

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{K}_{t+1} &= \int_0^1 \omega_{t+1,i} \tau \mathbf{a}_{t,i} / \Omega di \\ &= \tau \mathbf{A}_t \\ K_{t+1} &= \tau A_t / \psi_{t+1} \end{aligned}$$

Sticky Aggregate Expectations

$$\bar{\Theta}_{t,i} = \begin{cases} \Theta_t & \text{for updaters} \\ 1 & \text{for nonupdaters} \end{cases}$$

$$\bar{P}_{t+1,i} = \pi_{t+1,i} P_{t+1} + (1 - \pi_{t+1,i}) \bar{P}_{t,i} \quad (13)$$

Sequence within period:

- 1 Shocks are Realized
- 2 Each Individual Updates (Or Not)
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Behavior

Consumers behave according to frictionless consumption function:

$$\begin{aligned}\bar{c}_{t,i} &= c(\bar{m}_{t,i}) \\ \mathbf{c}_{t,i} &= \bar{c}_{t,i} \bar{P}_{t,i} p_{t,i}\end{aligned}$$

- Correctly perceive level of spending

$$\bar{\mathbf{a}}_{t,i} = \bar{\mathbf{m}}_{t,i} - \mathbf{c}_{t,i} \quad (14)$$

$$\bar{\mathbf{k}}_{t+1,i} = \omega_{t+1,i} \Upsilon (\mathbf{a}_{t,i} \pi_{t+1,i} + \bar{\mathbf{a}}_{t,i} (1 - \pi_{t+1,i})) / \Omega + (1 - \omega_{t+1,i}) 0 \quad (15)$$

Cost Of Stickiness

Newborns' value can be approximated by

$$\bar{v}(\mathcal{W}) \approx \overleftarrow{v}(\mathcal{W}) - (\kappa/\Pi)\sigma_{\Psi}^2. \quad (16)$$

If Newborns Pick Optimal Π , they solve

$$\max_{\Pi} \overleftarrow{v}(\mathcal{W}) - (\kappa/\Pi)\sigma_{\Psi}^2 - \iota\Pi. \quad (17)$$

Solution:

$$\Pi = (\kappa/\iota)^{0.5}\sigma_{\Psi} \quad (18)$$

Muth–Pischke Perception Dynamics

$$\bar{P}_{t+1} = \Pi P_{t+1} + (1 - \Pi)\bar{P}_t \quad (19)$$

- Observe \mathbf{Y}
- Define signal-to-noise ratio $\varphi = \sigma_\psi^2 / \sigma_\theta^2$

Optimal Estimate of P obtained from

$$\bar{P}_{t+1} = \Pi \mathbf{Y}_{t+1} + (1 - \Pi)\bar{P}_t \quad (20)$$

where

$$\Pi = \left(\frac{1}{1 + 2/(\varphi + \sqrt{\varphi^2 + 4\varphi})} \right), \quad (21)$$

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Comparison

$$\Pi = \left(\frac{1}{1 + 2/(\varphi + \sqrt{\varphi^2 + 4\varphi})} \right), \quad (22)$$

Pischke (1995): This is why \mathbf{C} is too smooth

- If we calibrate using observed micro data
 - $\Rightarrow \Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1} \approx 0.967 \Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t$
 - Goes too far!
- It's because people can't tell agg from ind shocks
- But calibration where they *can* see agg $Y \Rightarrow$ RW
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DSGE Model

Frictionless:

- No Idiosyncratic Shocks
- Aggregate Shocks Same as PE/SOE
- Cobb-Douglas production: $M_t = K_t + K_t^\epsilon \Theta_t^{1-\epsilon}$

$$V(M_t) = \max_{C_t} \left\{ \mathbf{u}(c_t) + \beta \mathbf{E}_t [\Psi_{t+1}^{1-\rho} V(M_{t+1})] \right\} \quad (23)$$

s.t.

$$A_t = M_t - C_t$$

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Sticky Expectations DSGE

- Perception Dynamics Identical to Sticky PE/SOE
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Benchmark: Random Walk

$$* \quad \Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1} \approx \varsigma + \vartheta \mathbf{E}_t[r_{t+1}] + \mu X_{t-1} + \epsilon_{t+1}, \quad (24)$$

and random walk means $\mu = 0$.

In GE, r depends on A so * is equivalent to:

$$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1} \approx \varsigma + \alpha A_t + \mu X_{t-1} + \epsilon_{t+1} \quad (25)$$

In either case, lots of X_{t-1} were found for which $\mu \neq 0$.

Campbell and Mankiw (1989)

$$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1} \approx \varsigma + \alpha A_t + \eta \mathbf{E}[\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}] + \epsilon_{t+1} \quad (26)$$

Claims:

- η estimates fraction of 'rule-of-thumb' $C = Y$ consumers
- $\eta \approx 0.5$ robustly for U.S. and other countries
- No further predictability in $\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1}$

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Macro Habits

Campbell and Deaton (1989); Rotemberg and Woodford (1997);
Fuhrer (2000); Sommer (2001)
Dynan (2000)/Sommer specification:

$$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1} \approx \varsigma + \alpha A_t + \eta \mathbf{E}[\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}] + \chi \mathbf{E}[\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t] + \epsilon_{t+1}$$

Claims:

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Micro Evidence

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Separable Theory:

- $\alpha < 0$
- $0 < \eta < 1$
- $\chi \approx 0$

Micro Evidence on Habits:

- No: Meghir and Weber (1996); Dynan (2000); Flavin and Nakagawa (2005)
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Micro Vs Macro

$$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1} \approx \varsigma + \chi \Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t + \eta \mathbf{E}_t[\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}] + \alpha A_t + \epsilon_{t+1}$$

	χ	η	α
<hr/>			
Micro (Separable)			
Theory	≈ 0	$0 < \eta < 1$	< 0
Data	≈ 0	$0 < \eta < 1$	< 0
<hr/>			
Macro			
Theory:Separable	≈ 0	≈ 0	< 0
Theory:CampMan	≈ 0	≈ 0.5	< 0
Theory:Habits	≈ 0.75	≈ 0	< 0

Calibration—DSGE

DSGE Model

Calibrated Parameters

ρ	2.	Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion
τ	$0.94^{1/4}$	Quarterly Depreciation Factor
K/K^e	12	Perf Foresight SS Capital/Output Ratio
σ_{Θ}^2	0.00001	Variance Qtrly Tran Agg Pty Shocks
σ_{Ψ}^2	0.00004	Variance Qtrly Perm Agg Pty Shocks

Steady State Solution of Model With $\sigma_{\Psi} = \sigma_{\Theta} = 0$

$K = 12^{1/(1-\epsilon)}$	≈ 48.55	Steady State Quarterly K/P Ratio
$M = K + K^e$	≈ 52.6	Steady State Quarterly M/P Ratio
$\mathcal{W} = (1 - \epsilon)K^e$	≈ 2.59	Quarterly Wage Rate
$\mathcal{R} = 1 + \epsilon K^{e-1}$	$= 1.03$	Quarterly Gross Capital Income Factor
$\mathbf{R} = \mathcal{R}\tau$	≈ 1.014	Quarterly Between-Period Interest Factor
$\beta = \mathbf{R}^{-1}$	≈ 0.986	Quarterly Time Preference Factor

Calibration—PE/SOE

Partial Equilibrium/Small Open Economy (PE/SOE) Model Parameters

Calibrated Parameters

σ_{ψ}^2	0.016	Variance Annual Perm Idiosyncratic Shocks (σ_{ψ})
σ_{θ}^2	0.03	Variance Annual Tran Idiosyncratic Shocks (σ_{θ})
ρ	0.05	Quarterly Probability of Unemployment Spell
Π	0.25	Quarterly Probability of Updating Expectations
$(1 - \Omega)$	0.005	Quarterly Probability of Mortality

Calculated Parameters

$\beta = 0.99\Omega/E[(\psi)^{-\rho}]\mathbf{R}$	0.965	Satisfies Impatience Condition: $\beta < \Omega/E[(\Psi)^{-\rho}]\mathbf{R}$
σ_{ψ}^2	0.004	Variance Qtrly Perm Idiosyncratic Shocks (σ_{ψ})
σ_{θ}^2	0.12	Variance Qtrly Tran Idiosyncratic Shocks (σ_{θ})

Equilibrium

	PE/SOE Economy		DSGE Economy	
	Frictionless	Sticky	Frictionless	Sticky
Means				
A	6.650	6.648	49.382	49.371
C	2.684	2.684	3.290	3.289
Standard Deviations				
Aggregate Time Series ('Macro')				
log A	0.089	0.091	0.085	0.085
$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}$	0.005	0.002	0.003	0.001
$\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}$	0.008	0.003	0.005	0.002
Individual Cross Sectional ('Micro')				
log a	1.273	1.273		
log c	1.207	1.207		
log p	1.221	1.221		
log y y > 0	0.846	0.846		
$\Delta \log \mathbf{c}$	0.151	0.149		
Cost Of Stickiness	0.31×10^{-4}		0.53×10^{-5}	

Micro Theory: Frictionless

$$\Delta \log \mathbf{c}_{t+1,i} = \varsigma + \chi \Delta \log \mathbf{c}_{t,i} + \eta \mathbf{E}_{t,i}[\Delta \log \mathbf{y}_{t+1,i}] + \alpha \underline{a}_{t,i}$$

Model of Expectations	χ	η	α	\bar{R}^2	nobs
Frictionless	0.083 (0.077)			0.007	76020
		0.003 (0.004)		-0.000	76020
			-0.111 (0.052)	0.000	76020
	0.083 (0.004)	0.009 (0.004)	-0.059 (0.024)	0.007	76020

Micro Theory: Sticky

$$\Delta \log \mathbf{c}_{t+1,i} = \varsigma + \chi \Delta \log \mathbf{c}_{t,i} + \eta \mathbf{E}_{t,i}[\Delta \log \mathbf{y}_{t+1,i}] + \alpha \underline{a}_{t,i}$$

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		0.003 (0.004)		-0.000	76020
			-0.111 (0.051)	0.000	76020
	0.083 (0.004)	0.009 (0.004)	-0.059 (0.024)	0.007	76020

DSGE Macro: Frictionless

$$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1} = \varsigma + \chi \Delta \mathbf{E}[\log \mathbf{C}_t] + \eta \mathbf{E}[\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}] + \alpha \mathbf{E}[A_t]$$

Expectations: Dep Var Independent Variables			OLS or IV	2nd Stage \bar{R}^2	IV F p-val IV OID
Frictionless: $\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1}$					
$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t$	$\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}$	A_t			
0.010 (0.032)			OLS	-0.001	
	0.184 (0.050)		IV	0.007	0.000 0.001
		-0.0002 (0.0001)	OLS	0.010	
-0.019 (0.027)	0.152 (0.052)	-0.0002 (0.0001)	IV	0.007	

DSGE Macro: Sticky

$$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1} = \varsigma + \chi \Delta \mathbf{E}[\log \mathbf{C}_t] + \eta \mathbf{E}[\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}] + \alpha \mathbf{E}[A_t]$$

Expectations: Dep Var Independent Variables			OLS or IV	2nd Stage \bar{R}^2	IV F p -val IV OID
$\Delta \log \bar{\mathbf{C}}_t$	Sticky $\Delta \log \bar{\mathbf{Y}}_{t+1}$	\bar{A}_t	OLS	0.677	
0.823 (0.018)					
$\Delta \log \bar{\bar{\mathbf{C}}}_t$			OLS	0.141	
0.387 (0.030)					
0.845 (0.042)			IV	0.422	0.000
	0.815 (0.025)		IV	0.395	0.000
		-0.0004 (0.0000)	OLS	0.115	0.000
0.750 (0.148)	0.065 (0.146)	-0.0001 (0.0000)	IV	0.423	0.126
Memo: For instruments \mathbf{Z}_t , $\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1} = \mathbf{Z}_t \zeta$, $\bar{R}^2 =$				0.425	

Small Open Economy: Frictionless

$$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1} = \varsigma + \chi \Delta \mathbf{E}[\log \mathbf{C}_t] + \eta \mathbf{E}[\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}] + \alpha \mathbf{E}[A_t]$$

Expectations: Dep Var Independent Variables			OLS or IV	2nd Stage \bar{R}^2	IV F p -val IV OI D
Frictionless: $\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1}$					
$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t$	$\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}$	A_t			
0.022 (0.010)			OLS	0.000	
	0.028 (0.016)		IV	0.000	0.000 0.030
		-0.0008 (0.0004)	OLS	0.000	
0.019 (0.010)	0.028 (0.016)	-0.0005 (0.0004)	IV	0.000	

Small Open Economy: Sticky

$$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1} = \varsigma + \chi \Delta \mathbf{E}[\log \mathbf{C}_t] + \eta \mathbf{E}[\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}] + \alpha \mathbf{E}[A_t]$$

Expectations: Dep Var Independent Variables			OLS or IV	2nd Stage \bar{R}^2	IV F p-val IV OID
$\Delta \log \bar{\mathbf{C}}_t$	$\Delta \log \bar{\mathbf{Y}}_{t+1}$	\bar{A}_t			
0.345 (0.009)			OLS	0.121	
0.805 (0.014)			IV	0.363	0.000
	1.150 (0.015)		IV	0.352	0.000
0.498 (0.028)	0.496 (0.040)	-0.0007 (0.0005)	IV	0.375	0.000
Memo: For instruments \mathbf{Z}_t , $\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1} = \mathbf{Z}_t \zeta$, $\bar{R}^2 =$				0.390	

Empirical Results for U.S.

Consumption Series	$\Delta \log C_{t+1} = \zeta + \chi \Delta \log C_t + \eta E[\Delta \log Y_{t+1}] + \alpha A_t$			Method OLS/IV	\bar{R}_2^2	IV F IV OID	p-val OID
	χ	η	α				
Nondurables and Services	0.358*** (0.066)			OLS	0.123		
		0.577*** (0.118)		IV	0.172	0.000	0.702
			0.0006 (0.0006)	OLS	0.002		
	0.826*** (0.147)			IV	0.143	0.000	0.714
	0.731*** (0.230)	0.071 (0.118)	0.0000 (0.0003)	IV	0.135		0.482
Memo:	For instruments \mathbf{Z} , $\Delta \log C_{t+1} = \mathbf{Z}\zeta$, $\bar{R}^2 = 0.168$						

Instruments: L(2/3).diffcons L(2/3).wyRatio L(2/3).bigTheta L(2/3).dfedfunds L(2/3).ics
 Time frame: 1960Q1–2004Q3, $\sigma_{\psi}^2 = .0000429$, $\sigma_{\Theta}^2 = .0000107$

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