Event-day options

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Abstract

This paper considers new options on Treasury and stock futures that expire each Wednesday and Friday. I examine the volatilities implied by these options as of the night before expiration, and compare the volatilities just before FOMC days and employment report days with the volatilities on other Tuesdays or Thursdays, respectively. This can be used to measure the risk neutral uncertainty associated with FOMC announcements and employment reports. I can also compare the average physical and risk neutral uncertainty: the difference between them is the average variance risk premium. Average variance risk premia are large and significantly positive, especially for FOMC days. Lastly, I construct options-implied densities on the eve of FOMC and employment report days.

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1 Introduction

Economists have long used options to infer risk-neutral volatilities. For example, the VIX is the annualized implied volatility on options with one month to expiration, and is widely used as a measure of market uncertainty about stock prices. The VIX, like most options has a horizon that is too long to measure the uncertainty associated with an individual specific event. However, since 2011, the CME has traded weekly options expiring each Friday at 2pm Central Time on Treasury and S&P500 futures. And, since 2017, weekly options on the same underlying securities that expire each Wednesday have been added. These options can give us more granular measures of uncertainty. Friday options on the S&P500 futures were examined in Andersen et al. (2017) who used these options to identify time-varying negative jump tail risk.

In this paper, I use these weekly options to measure uncertainty as of the day before major events: employment reports and FOMC meetings. The employment report is nearly always released on Fridays and so the volatility implied by options expiring on the next day as of Thursday close of business gives a measure of *ex ante* uncertainty specifically associated with the employment report. Likewise, the volatility implied by Wednesday options as of the Tuesday before a Wednesday FOMC meeting is informative about the *ex ante* uncertainty associated with that FOMC meeting. Note that in the recent years, all FOMC meetings have ended on Wednesdays except for meetings in November that occur in the same week as a federal election day. These FOMC meetings have instead ended on Thursdays, and are not included in my analysis.

The jobs data are not the only news on employment-report Fridays; there is volatility associated with other information coming to the market on that day. I can use Friday options corresponding to Fridays that do not have employment reports to control for this. Likewise, I can use Wednesday options corresponding to non-FOMC Wednesdays to control for the normal volatility on Wednesdays. In this way, the volatility caused by employment reports and FOMC meetings can be measured.
Options-implied volatility is volatility under the risk neutral, or $Q$ measure. Volatility under the physical, or $P$ measure can also be computed, using realized volatility from the underlying futures contract. The difference between the two is the variance risk premium that has been widely studied in longer maturity options (Bollerslev et al., 2009; Choi et al., 2017; Muller et al., 2017). The variance risk premium for these one day options can be estimated on the night before FOMC meetings and employment reports, to measure the compensation that investors seek for this particular source of uncertainty. I find sizeable and positive variance risk premia in these event day options, especially for FOMC days.

Much attention has been given in recent years to the measurement of various aspects of economic uncertainty (e.g. Baker et al. (2016)), and indeed uncertainty is sometimes seen as an important driver of economic fluctuations. More specifically, several papers have constructed measures of time-varying monetary policy uncertainty using textual analysis (Lucas et al., 2020) or using quarterly eurodollar options (Bauer et al., 2019). This paper also aims at the measurement of monetary policy uncertainty, as well as uncertainty around jobs data, but gets a more precise measure of uncertainty associated with a specific event by using options prices with just one day left to expiration.

Both Andersen et al. (2017) and Liu et al. (2020) examine weekly S&P500 options and study their behavior around FOMC announcements. In this paper, I am comparing the volatilities the day before employment reports and FOMC meetings with their counterparts on non-employment report Fridays and non-FOMC Wednesdays. Moreover, this paper considers Wednesday and Friday options on Treasury futures which have not been used in the literature to date, as far as I am aware.

The plan for the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes trading in these weekly options. Section 3 analyzes the implied volatilities associated with employment reports and FOMC meetings, both on average and for individual meetings. In this section, I also find that employment reports where there is higher uncertainty also exhibit a greater sensitivity
of Treasury prices to a given payrolls surprise. Section 4 examines the estimates of variance risk premia. Section 5 extends the analysis to consider options-implied risk-neutral probability density functions for returns on FOMC and employment report days. Section 6 concludes.

2 Weekly options

Weekly options on S&P and five-, ten- and thirty-year Treasury futures contracts have been trading since 2011\(^1\). These options expire each Friday, and are first listed 8 days before expiration, with adjustments for exchange holidays. At present, they are traded in increments of 25 cents per $100 face value for five- and ten-year Treasuries, 50 cents per $100 face value for thirty-year Treasuries and 5 index points for the S&P. In terms of implied yields using the duration of the cheapest-to-deliver security in each Treasury futures basket, these are increments of between 4 and 7 basis points. In the past, the grids for Treasury futures were wider.

Starting in 2017, comparable weekly options were listed expiring each Wednesday.

For Friday options, the data are treated as missing if either the Thursday or Friday is a CME exchange holiday. If the Thursday is an exchange holiday, there are clearly no data for that day. If the Friday is an exchange holiday, the option is listed but expires on Thursday instead and so the Thursday settlement price simply represents the expiration value of the option. In the same way, for Wednesday options, the data are missing if either the Tuesday or Wednesday is an exchange holiday.

For the S&P options, there are also end-of-month options that expire on the last business day of the month. In these cases, the corresponding Wednesday or Friday option would not be listed.

Table 1 lists the average daily trading volume in Wednesday and Friday options in 2019. The

\(^1\)A pilot version of the S&P Friday weekly options started trading in 2005, but it was only in 2011 that Treasuries were added.
Table also lists the comparable statistics for regular quarterly options, as a benchmark. Each Treasury option is an option on an underlying futures contract with a face value of $100,000. Each S&P500 option is an option on the underlying futures contract with a face value of 50 times the S&P 500 index, or about $140,000 on average in 2019. Options on both regular and E-mini S&P 500 futures contracts are traded. I am using the E-mini futures options throughout this paper, because their transactions volumes are higher even after adjusting for the fact that their notional face value is one fifth the size of the regular contract.

In Table 1, it can be seen that trading volume is lower in the weekly options than in the regular quarterly options. Trading volume is higher in the Friday options than the Wednesday options because these options have been traded for longer, because there are 12 employment report Fridays a year and at most 8 FOMC scheduled Wednesday meetings a year, and because typical volatility on employment report days is greater than typical volatility on FOMC announcement days. Still the volume in weekly options is quite high, especially in the ten-year options. An average daily trading volume of 4,258 contracts (the volume of Wednesday 30-year contracts, which is the smallest in the Table) corresponds to a notional underlying of over $400 million. These volumes are presumably big enough to reflect the beliefs of traders in these markets.

Weekly options on two-year Treasury futures are also listed on the CME. However, in contrast to all the above weekly options, liquidity in these options is very poor. The average trading volume in Friday weekly options on two-year Treasury futures contracts in 2019 was only 142. Moreover the reported settlement prices on these contracts are generally the minimum tick size ($1\div 128$). It is for this reasons that I do not consider two-year weekly Treasury options, even though the two-year yield is often seen as the best measure of the stance of monetary policy.
3  Implied volatilities associated with events

For any given type of contract (underlying security and a Wednesday or Friday expiration), let \( IV_t \) be the options-implied volatility as of the close of business settlement price on the evening before an option expiration. Throughout, by options-implied volatility I mean options-implied variance because if we think of there being background uncertainty and independent uncertainty associated with an event, the total variance on an event day should be the sum of the two components, whereas standard deviations do not add up in this way. Let \( E_t \) be a dummy if is 1 if this is the day before an event. An event is an FOMC announcement for a Wednesday expiration or an employment report for a Friday expiration and consider the regressions:

\[
IV_t = \alpha + \sum_{i=1}^{p} \beta_i IV_{t-i} + \gamma E_t + \epsilon_t
\]

which are run separately for all Tuesdays (using Wednesday options) and Thursdays (using Friday options) where \( p \) is the lag order to be determined by the Bayes Information Criterion.

I interpret \( \gamma \) as the options-implied volatility induced by the event, over and above the volatility that would have been present on that day in any case. Table 2 reports the estimates of the coefficients \( \gamma \), along with Newey-West standard errors. The estimates of \( \gamma \) are all positive and statistically significant. For FOMC meetings, the estimated \( \gamma \) for ten-year options is 0.065 percentage points. This corresponds to a standard deviation of 25 basis points in price terms. As the duration of a ten-year futures option is around 6 years, it corresponds to a standard deviation of a little more than 4 basis points in yield terms. The FOMC meeting also significantly raises stock price implied volatility. Consistent with this, Beber and Brandt (2009), Fernandez-Perez et al. (2017) and Amengual and Xiu (2018) show that the VIX—a one month implied volatility—falls after FOMC meetings and Andersen et al. (2017) shows that Friday weekly S&P500 options implied volatilities fall after FOMC meetings. However, my approach provides an \textit{ex ante} measure of uncertainty before the FOMC meeting which is distinct from a measure
of how much uncertainty was reduced after the meeting.

For employment reports, the estimated $\gamma$s are larger in all cases. The estimated $\gamma$ is more than 4 times larger for thirty-year yields ahead of employment reports than for thirty-year yields ahead of FOMC meetings.

The uncertainty associated with monetary policy announcements is smaller, because in recent years, the FOMC has been very careful to communicate its likely policy actions before the meeting, and to avoid big surprises in the FOMC announcement.

FOMC meetings are not all alike, even ex ante. Over this period, some were followed with both a press conference and release of FOMC economic projections—the Summary of Economic Projections (SEP). Some were followed with a press conference and no SEP release. And some were followed with neither. In each case it was known well ahead of time which type of meeting it would be. Where applicable, the SEP gets released at the same time as the FOMC statement, 2pm Eastern Time. The press conference begins at 2:30pm Eastern Time and generally last for about 45 minutes. The options that I work with expire at 2pm Central Time, or 3pm Eastern Time. Thus, the end of the press conference gets truncated. But any extra volatility attributed to the press conferences might not be uncertainty associated with the comments by the Federal Reserve Chair per se, but rather might reflect investors expecting bigger news to come out at FOMC meetings that are followed by press conferences. Thus I consider, for Wednesday expiry options only, an expanded regression:

$$IV_t = \alpha + \sum_{i=1}^{p} \beta_i IV_{t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^{3} \gamma_i E_{it} + \varepsilon_t$$  \hspace{1cm} (3.2)

where $E_{1t}$ is 1 for any FOMC meeting, $E_{2t}$ is 1 for an FOMC meeting with a press conference, and $E_{3t}$ is 1 for an FOMC meeting with an SEP release. So an FOMC meeting with a press conference and an SEP would have $E_{1t} = E_{2t} = E_{3t} = 1$. The estimates of the coefficients $\{\gamma_i\}$ in equation (3.2) are reported in Table 3. It is somewhat difficult to tease out the separate effects of an FOMC
meeting, an SEP release and a press conference. In the sample, there are only 5 meetings without a press conference, and there are only 7 meetings that have a press conference but no SEP. This leads to a clear multicollinearity problem, especially given that my sample period covers only a bit more than 3 years of data. Nonetheless, the estimate for the extra volatility caused by the press conference is statistically significant for the five- and ten-year Treasury futures. This finding is consistent with Boguth et al. (2019), who found that the ex post surprises measured by year-ahead Eurodollar futures were bigger at meetings with press conferences than those without, and the drop in the VIX was bigger after meetings with press conferences than those without. The extra uncertainty associated with press conferences may be because of anticipation of information that might revealed by the Fed chair at the press conference, or simply because the press conference coordinates the attention of investors (Boguth et al., 2019). To some degree it is a moot point because since the start of 2019, the FOMC has had a press conference following every meeting. The average extra volatility caused by the SEP release over and above the meeting itself and the press conference is estimated to be positive, but is not statistically significant for any of the four returns considered.

Tables 2 and 3 have measured the average extra volatility associated with given types of event. But, especially in light of the ex ante nature of this measurement of event uncertainty, it is useful to be able to measure the options-implied volatility associated with a specific FOMC meeting or employment report, and might be particularly useful to central banks and observers of financial markets. To that end, I let \( \hat{\alpha} \) and \( \hat{\beta}_i \) denote the estimated values from equation (3.1) and then define:

\[
\theta_i = \sqrt{IV_t - \hat{\alpha} - \sum_{i=1}^{p} \hat{\beta}_i IV_{t-i}}
\]

for any event day as the square root of the difference between the implied variance for that day and what would be predicted if it were not an event day. In estimating the parameters of (3.1) for making the prediction on day \( t \), I use only data from \( t \) and earlier in a recursive out-of-sample forecasting scheme. This means that the values of \( \theta_t \) that I obtain would be exactly those that
would have been obtained by a researcher in real time. There is nothing to guarantee that the implied standard deviation is positive and so that $\theta_t$ is real. Figure 1 plots the implied $\theta_t$ for ten-year futures FOMC meetings (top panel) and for employment reports (bottom panel) for ten-year Treasury options. It turns out that all the estimated $\theta_t$s for FOMC meetings are real except for 2 of the 24 FOMC meetings and 3 of the 100 employment reports (these are not shown in the Figure).

Looking at the top panel, the implied standard deviations of ten-year futures (in price terms) fluctuate over time. Three points are labeled; March 2018 which was a meeting in the Fed’s last tightening cycle, June 2019, and June 2020 amid the response to the COVID recession. All three meetings showed high uncertainty, and all were accompanied by a press conference and an SEP release. The standard deviation at these three meetings is around 45 basis points in price terms which translates into about 7 basis points in yield terms. The June 2019 meeting, and the subsequent two meetings which also had high uncertainty, came at the time that there was speculation that the Fed would ease monetary policy. As it transpired, an easing cycle did begin at the July 2019 meeting, but there had been some speculation of a possible rate cut in June, and indeed one FOMC member dissented and voted for a rate cut at that meeting. In the bottom panel, the implied standard deviations of ten-year futures on jobs report days was around 50 basis points until the end of 2016, before falling to a lower level. This could be because uncertainty about the employment report declined in the later years of the decade. But it is more likely that uncertainty about the Fed’s reaction to the employment report declined. Until late 2014, the Fed was undertaking large scale asset purchases to influence the level of long-term interest rates. Stronger-than-expected data would indicate fewer large scale asset purchases going forward and vice-versa, and so it is not surprising that ten-year yields were volatile around jobs Fridays. Indeed Swanson and Williams (2014) found that at the zero lower bound, ten-year yields were somewhat more sensitive to economic news than is normally the case. In the later

\footnote{For the first 10 observations, it is not possible to estimate the parameters on lagged data with any precision, and so I instead define $\theta_t^*$ as the square root of the difference between $IV_t$ and the average value of $IV_t$ over non-event days before day $t$.}
part of the sample, the Fed was back to using short term interest rates as the tool of monetary policy, and these did not appear very sensitive to small economic surprises.

### 3.1 Uncertainty and the price impact of surprises

There is a vast “event study” literature looking at the effects of macroeconomic surprises on asset prices in high-frequency data. Macroeconomic data surprises have systematic effects on asset prices, with the nonfarm payrolls release being the most important one (Gilbert et al., 2017).

It is natural to ask if a given employment report surprise has a different effect when uncertainty is high or low, and the uncertainty measure associated with individual employment reports described in the last subsection is ideally suited to answer this question. To this end, I consider the regression:

$$ r_t = \beta_0 S_t + \beta_1 S_t \theta_t + \epsilon_t $$  \hspace{1cm} (3.4)

where $r_t$ is the return on a futures contract from right before an employment report announcement to 15 minutes afterwards, $S_t$ is the surprise in the nonfarm payrolls announcement, measured as the released value less the MMS-Action Economics survey expectation, and $\theta_t$ is the ex ante uncertainty measure defined in equation (3.3). The results are reported in Table 4. The results are shown excluding the observations after April 1 2020. \(^3\)

The coefficient $\beta_1$ is negative and highly significant for all three Treasury futures. A stronger-than-expected nonfarm payrolls release leads to negative Treasury returns (I am working with prices not yields), and the higher is uncertainty, the more negative the return is. This is consistent with the model and findings in Kim and Verrecchia (1991) and Benamar et al. (forth-
coming). As in the previous subsection, I interpret the uncertainty measure associated with individual employment reports not so much as measuring time-varying uncertainty about the number of jobs created, but rather as measuring the time-varying sensitivity of expected monetary policy to a given surprise. When this uncertainty is high, a surprise leads to a larger updating of monetary policy expectations and a larger reaction in Treasury futures prices. For S&P500 futures, neither of the coefficients is statistically significant. The response of stock prices to employment data is ambiguous as stronger-than-expected data both raise the expected cash flow of firms but also the discount rate, which work in opposite directions, and which effect dominates depends on the state of the business cycle (Andersen et al., 2007).

In this subsection, I have examined the relationship between uncertainty and the price impact per unit payrolls surprise. There is no analogous exercise for the FOMC announcements. Over this period, there have been no surprises in the target federal funds rate. The news arising from FOMC meetings is about the future path of policy and asset purchases which is typically quantified by the size of the jumps in medium- and long-term interest rates around FOMC announcements (Swanson, forthcoming), but it does not then make much sense to ask what effects these surprises have on Treasury futures rates.

4 Variance risk premia associated with events

The weekly options that considered in this paper are all based on quarterly Treasury futures contracts, with settlement in March, June, September and December of each year. Thus, the \textit{ex-post} realized volatility from five-minute squared returns can be measured as:

\[ RV_t = \sum_{i=1}^{n} (\log(P_{it}) - \log(P_{it-1}))^2 \]  \hfill (4.1)
where $P_{it}$ is the futures price in the $i$th five-minute period on day $t$. I can then estimate the regression:

$$RV_t - IV_t = \alpha + \sum_{i=1}^{p} \beta_i (RV_{t-i} - IV_{t-i}) + \gamma E_t + \epsilon_t$$

over all Tuesdays (using Wednesday options) or Thursdays (using Friday options), where $E_t$ represents the event-day dummy as before, the coefficient $\gamma$ represents the average variance risk premium and $p$ is the lag order to be determined by the Bayes Information Criterion. Of course $RV_t$ is not known until the end of day $t$, but all the other variables, including the previous-day implied and realized volatility are known at the end of day $t - 1$, and so this still allows us to estimate the average variance risk premium. What I call here the variance risk premium, includes the risk premium associated with diffusion and jump components of the event day return. The FOMC or employment report will lead to jumps in asset prices, and the associated jump risk premia are an important part of what I identify as variance risk premia.

Table 5 reports the estimates of the coefficients $\gamma$, along with Newey-West standard errors. The variance risk premia are estimated to be positive and nearly all are statistically significant. Comparing Tables 2 and 5, it can be seen that for five- and ten- and Treasury futures on FOMC days, about half of the typical increase in options-implied variance is a variance risk premium, with the other half mechanically being an increase in physical volatility. For thirty-year Treasury futures on FOMC days, most of the typical increase in options-implied variance is a variance risk premium. For employment reports, only a small share of the increase in options-implied variance in the ten- and thirty-year futures is a variance risk premium, even though the variance risk premia are all statistically significant. Although employment reports give much larger boosts to options-implied volatility than FOMC days, the increase in the variance risk premium for thirty-year Treasuries is comparable on employment report and FOMC days, and for stocks it is bigger on FOMC days. This suggests that news about monetary policy leads investors to demand particularly large variance risk premia.

To conclude, in existing work, unconditional variance risk premia are found to be positive
in both stock and Treasury markets, and that same pattern appears to be true for the variance risk premia implied by event day options. There is particular evidence for variance risk premia associated with FOMC days.

5 Risk neutral pdfs

It is natural to go beyond risk neutral implied volatilities, and instead consider the risk neutral probability density functions (pdfs) implied by these event-day options. A challenge with this is that on the evening before the expiration of the option, most strike prices for Treasury options are almost certain to expire either in the money or out-of-the-money. For example, for a ten-year futures option, a $1 price movement would be an exceptionally large one-day change, corresponding to about a 14 basis point one-day interest rate change, and yet the strikes are listed in increments of 25 cents (50 cents before 2016). Thus only a handful of options at strike prices that are not far in the tails of the distribution.

Instead of trying to construct the risk neutral pdf for Treasury options on individual days, I pool options at different strike prices over the days in the sample, treating Wednesday and Friday options separately and treating event and non-event days separately. I then consider a specification in which the Black Scholes implied volatility (standard deviation) on option \( i \) on day \( t \), \( \sigma_{it} \), is a function of the moneyness of that option, \( M_{it} \):

\[
\sigma_{it} = f(M_{it}). \tag{5.1}
\]

Note that all the options by construction have the same time to maturity of one day. This specification is considered for all days that are the days before expiration of an option, with Wednesday and Friday options treated separately. Following Aït-Sahalia and Duarte (2003) I fit a local linear regression to equation (2) approximating equation (2) at moneyness \( M' \) in a neighbor-
hood around $M \beta_0(M) + \beta_1(M)(M' - M)$. I estimate the coefficients as:

$$\hat{\beta}_0(M), \hat{\beta}_1(M) = \arg \min_{\beta_0(M), \beta_1(M)} \sum_{i=1}^{L} (\sigma_{it} - \beta_0(M)\beta_1(M)(M_{it} - M))^2 K\left(\frac{M_{it} - M}{h}\right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (5.2)

where $K(.)$ is a kernel function and $h$ is the bandwidth. This is run separately for Wednesday and Friday options, and, within each, separately for event and non-event days. In each case the implied volatilities are converted back into call option prices for a fine grid of option moneyness by the Black-Scholes formula, and I take the numerical second derivative of these call option prices, that is well known to give the risk neutral probability density function (Breeden and Litzenberger, 1978; Ross, 1976).

I do this exercise for five-, ten and thirty-year Treasury futures using all available options prices that are within $1 of being at the money. Figure 2 plots the estimated implied volatility functions. Figure 3 plots the implied risk-neutral pdfs. The implied pdfs are generally fairly close to normal, but are somewhat fat tailed.

5.1 Risk neutral pdfs for stocks

Things are a little different for stock price options, because there are options in multiples of 5 points for the S&P 500 which means that there are typically 20 or more options where the investor does not know whether they will expire in or out of the money, even on the night before expiration. So in this case, I construct risk neutral pdfs on individual days rather than pooling options over different days. The methodology is otherwise the same as before, with a local linear regression as in equation (5.2) used to fit the relationship between implied volatility and the strike price of the option. Figure 4 plots the implied risk-neutral pdfs for days of two FOMC meetings and two employment reports. The implied pdfs are distinctly nonnormal and skewed to the left.
5.2 Probability Integral Transform

To compare these densities to physical densities, I take the option-implied cumulative distribution function and assess where in this distribution the ex-post realized futures returns lie. If the options-implied distribution is indeed the physical distribution, then it is well-known that these percentiles should be uniformly distributed (see e.g. Diebold et al. (1998)). This is the probability integral transform (PIT) and is plotted in Figure 5 for FOMC days and in Figure 6 for employment report days. It can be seen that the probability integral transform is quite far from uniform. For Treasury futures on FOMC days, the actual realization was never in either the top decile of the options-implied distribution or the bottom decile. This is consistent with the variance risk premium documented earlier—the options-implied volatility is too high relative to realized volatility and so extreme movements are seen by investors as high marginal utility states of the world that they are willing to pay to hedge against. For stock futures on FOMC days, the actual realization was never in either of the bottom two deciles, but was in the top two deciles on several occasions. For Treasury futures on employment report days, the actual realization was seldom in the lower or upper tails of the options implied distribution. For stock futures on employment report days, the actual realization was seldom in the lower tails.

Overall, although the PITs confirm that the options-implied volatility is too high, the discrepancy between physical and risk-neutral distributions appears larger for big price declines than for big price increases, especially for stocks. This is consistent with what Feunou et al. (2018) term the downside variance risk premium being bigger than the upside variance risk premium, although they were not looking at FOMC day and employment report events specifically.

I can test the statistical significance of the deviation of the PIT from the uniform distribution. Let \( \hat{F}(r) \) denote the empirical cdf of the PIT and define \( \Psi(r) = T^{-1/2}(\hat{F}(r) - r), 0 \leq r \leq 1 \).
Two standard test statistics (Darling, 1957) are:

\[ K = \sup_{0 \leq r \leq 1} \Psi(r) \]  \hspace{1cm} (5.3)

and

\[ C = \int_0^1 \Psi(r)^2 dr. \]  \hspace{1cm} (5.4)

I compare these test statistics with the bootstrap of (Rossi and Sekhposyan, 2019) and report the test statistics and bootstrap \( p \)-values in Table 6. The \( C \) test and \( K \) tests are all significant at the 5 percent level on FOMC days. On employment report days, they are significant at the 5 percent level for five-year Treasuries and stocks, but not for ten- or thirty-year Treasuries. The comparison of realized and implied volatility and the PIT tests both give consistent results, pointing to variance risk premia on event days, but there are some cases where the statistical evidence is stronger using the comparison of realized and implied volatility and other cases where it is stronger using the PIT tests. This is because the two tests differ in their power. On the one hand, the PIT test uses only daily returns, whereas realized volatility uses intradaily returns which allow, in principle, for arbitrarily precise estimation of daily volatility (Merton, 1980; Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998) and might make the PIT test somewhat less powerful. On the other hand, the PIT test considers the entire density not just the second moment, which might make it somewhat more powerful.

### 5.3 Comparison with Economic Derivatives

The closest analog to these event-day options is a market in “Economic Derivatives” that existed from 2002 to 2006. This was a market for digital options in which investors could trade securities that had a payoff of $1 if a specific macroeconomic data release fell into a specific range, and expired worthless otherwise. The prices for these options directly give risk-neutral probabilities for the released value of the macroeconomic data. These probabilities were studied carefully
by Gürkaynak and Wright (2013). The probability densities were found to be somewhat more accurate estimates of the mean than surveys, and an exercise like that in the previous subsection showed that these probability densities were well calibrated. The key difference between the market for economic derivatives and the event-day options studied here, apart from sample period, is that the payoffs from economic derivatives were based on the released values of macroeconomic data, whereas the payoffs from weekly options are based on bond and stock prices. Unlike economic derivatives, weekly options embed volatility risk premia which lead the Q-measure densities to overweight extreme outcomes.

6 Conclusions

Economic data is released in a lumpy manner which allows researchers to study the effects of data releases on asset prices. This paper takes a different approach to analyzing event studies. It takes new options that expire each Wednesday and Friday and uses these to analyze the implied volatility and the risk neutral probability densities as of the night before large macroeconomic events: the FOMC meeting and the jobs report. These events lead to elevated options-implied volatility and increase the volatility risk premium. The large volatility risk premium in Treasuries around FOMC announcements suggests that monetary policy uncertainty is a significant driver of the overall Treasury volatility risk premium.
References


### Table 1: Average Daily Volume in Selected Options Classes: 2019

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<th>5 Year</th>
<th>10 Year</th>
<th>30 Year</th>
<th>S&amp;P</th>
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<td>140,064</td>
<td>28,228</td>
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<td>Wednesday</td>
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<td>21,262</td>
<td>4,258</td>
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<td>End of Month</td>
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<td>90,220</td>
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Notes: Source: Chicago Mercantile Exchange 2019 Options Review.

### Table 2: Estimates of Average volatility induced by events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Five-year</th>
<th>Ten-year</th>
<th>Thirty-year</th>
<th>S&amp;P 500</th>
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<td>(0.018)</td>
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<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.115)</td>
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<td>Employment Report</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
<td>(0.223)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table reports the estimates of the coefficient $\gamma$ in equation (3.1) along with Newey-West standard errors with a lag truncation parameter of 6. The sample period is January 2011-August 2020 for employment reports and June 2017-August 2020 for FOMC meetings. The estimated equation also includes a constant and lagged autoregressive terms (order chosen by BIC), but these coefficient estimates are not reported. One, two and three asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.

### Table 3: Estimates of average volatility induced by different FOMC events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Five-year</th>
<th>Ten-year</th>
<th>Thirty-year</th>
<th>S&amp;P 500</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FOMC Meeting ($\gamma_1$)</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.022***</td>
<td>0.078**</td>
<td>-0.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.140)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press Conference ($\gamma_2$)</td>
<td>0.043**</td>
<td>0.046**</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.328*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
<td>(0.183)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEP ($\gamma_3$)</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td>(0.283)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table reports the estimates of the coefficients $\gamma_1$, $\gamma_2$ and $\gamma_3$ in equation (3.2) along with Newey-West standard errors with a lag truncation parameter of 6. The sample period is June 2017- August 2020. The estimated equation also includes a constant and lagged autoregressive terms (order chosen by BIC), but these coefficient estimates are not reported. One, two and three asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Table 4: Estimates of effects of nonfarm payrolls surprises

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Five-year</th>
<th>Ten-year</th>
<th>Thirty-year</th>
<th>S&amp;P 500</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$S_t$</td>
<td>7.26</td>
<td>12.26</td>
<td>18.20*</td>
<td>13.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.14)</td>
<td>(7.62)</td>
<td>(11.14)</td>
<td>(14.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$S_t \theta_t$</td>
<td>-72.37***</td>
<td>-114.91***</td>
<td>-168.31***</td>
<td>45.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(15.32)</td>
<td>(23.55)</td>
<td>(33.06)</td>
<td>(37.22)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table reports the estimates of the coefficients $\beta_0$ and $\beta_1$ in equation (3.4) along with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. The sample period is January 2011-March 2020. The surprises are measured in thousands of jobs, the volatility $\theta_t$ is defined in equation (3.3), and the returns on futures contracts are measured in basis points. One, two and three asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Table 5: Estimates of Average variance risk premia induced by events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Five-year</th>
<th>Ten-year</th>
<th>Thirty-year</th>
<th>S&amp;P 500</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FOMC</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.031**</td>
<td>0.116***</td>
<td>0.248***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Report</td>
<td>0.028***</td>
<td>0.077***</td>
<td>0.177***</td>
<td>0.204**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table reports the estimates of the coefficient $\gamma$ in equation (4.2) along with Newey-West standard errors with a lag truncation parameter of 6. The sample period is January 2011-August 2020 for employment reports and June 2017-August 2020 for FOMC meetings. The estimated equation also includes a constant and lagged autoregressive terms (order chosen by BIC), but these coefficient estimates are not reported. One, two and three asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Five-year</th>
<th></th>
<th>Ten-year</th>
<th></th>
<th>Thirty-year</th>
<th></th>
<th>S&amp;P500</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$K$</td>
<td>$C$</td>
<td>$K$</td>
<td>$C$</td>
<td>$K$</td>
<td>$C$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOMC</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p$-value</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Report</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>1.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p$-value</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table reports the test statistics for statistical significance of the deviation from uniformity of the probability integral transform of one-day Treasury futures returns using the corresponding options implied cumulative distribution functions on FOMC days and on employment report days. The test statistics are those given in equations (5.3) and (5.4) along with the associated $p$-values using the bootstrap of Rossi and Sekhposyan (2019).
Figure 1: Implied Volatility Associated with Individual Events.

NOTE: This figure plots the square root of the difference between the options implied volatility ahead of each specific event and the real-time implied predicted value if that day were not an event day, constructed as described in the text (see equation (3.3)). The implied volatilities are in price terms and in percentage points, not annualized. In the top panel, three observations are labeled, and the labeled observations are shaded in red.
Figure 2: Options Implied Volatility as functions of the moneyness

NOTE: This figure plots the local linear estimate of Black-Scholes implied volatility for five-, ten- and thirty-year Treasury options plotted against the moneyness of the option. For this figure, all days within each of four groups are pooled: FOMC Wednesdays, other Wednesdays, employment report Fridays and other Fridays. The implied volatilities for FOMC and employment report days are the solid red lines and the pdfs for other Wednesdays and other Fridays are the dashed blue lines.
Figure 3: Options Implied Treasury PDF as functions of the moneyness

**Figure 3: Options Implied Treasury PDF as functions of the moneyness**

![5 Year Wed Options](image1)
![5 Year Fri Options](image2)
![10 Year Wed Options](image3)
![10 Year Fri Options](image4)
![30 Year Wed Options](image5)
![30 Year Fri Options](image6)

**NOTE:** This figure plots the probability density function (pdf) for five-, ten- and thirty-year Treasury options plotted against the moneyness of the option. For this figure, all days within each of four groups are pooled: FOMC Wednesdays, other Wednesdays, employment report Fridays and other Fridays. The pdfs are calculated by converting smoothed options implied volatilities into call prices by the Black Scholes formula and then taking the second derivative. The pdfs for FOMC and employment report days are the solid red lines and the pdfs for other Wednesdays and other Fridays are the dashed blue lines.
Figure 4: Options-Implied S&P500 pdfs on select days

NOTE: This figure plots the probability density function (pdf) for the S&P500 on four specific dates: two FOMC meeting days (left column) and two Employment Reports (right column). These pdfs are based on options prices on the previous evening. The pdfs are calculated by converting smoothed options implied volatilities into call prices by the Black Scholes formula and then taking the second derivative.
Figure 5: PITs for realized futures returns on FOMC days

**PIT: 5 Year**

**PIT: 10 Year**

**PIT: 30 Year**

**PIT: Stocks**

**NOTE:** This figure shows the probability integral transform (PIT) of realized one-day five, ten- and thirty-year Treasury futures returns and one-day stock returns using the corresponding options implied cumulative distribution function on FOMC days. If the options implied distribution were equal to the physical distribution, then this should be uniform in population, as shown by the line.
Figure 6: PITs for realized futures returns on Employment Report days

**PIT: 5 Year**

**PIT: 10 Year**

**PIT: 30 Year**

**PIT: Stocks**

NOTE: This figure show the probability integral transform (PIT) of realized one-day five, ten- and thirty-year Treasury futures returns and one-day stock returns using the corresponding options implied cumulative distribution function on Employment Report days. If the options implied distribution were equal to the physical distribution, then this should be uniform in population, as shown by the line.